Let me give you a little more technicolor on this one, since I was at UP at the time.
UP actually wanted to build Global 3 near Maple Park, Illinois, which would have put it roughly 30 miles closer to Chicago than the eventual location near Rochelle. Maple Park fell through because of local opposition.
Company managements have idea. When management changes the idea also change.
Global 3 was an idea implemented before PSR came to the fore for operating railroads.
CSX built a intermodal terminal at McKees Rocks, PA under the Michael Ward regime, he successor killed it and I believe sold or leased the property upon which it had been built.
**Posting a quote from the article on TRAINS Neweswire regarding the 1,000 issue of the Magazine… FTA:"…“I’ll leave you with this thought. Very few magazines make it to 1,000 issues. Perhaps as few as 50 magazines have ever reached this number. Kalmbach Media now has two of them. Thank you for being part of our success story.” — Trains Editor Carl Swanson "
New ideas in railroadiing, and in business, seem to last…NEW administrations like to leave their own historica
CSX built the North West Ohio (NWO) intermodal center at North Baltimore, OH.
EHH/PSR closed it, but then CSX opened it up again, and now it’s expanded, and as busy as ever.
Global 3 made sense to someone, and maybe it’ll make sense again in the future.
If I recall correctly, the original concept behind North Baltimore was that it was to function like an airline hub but for intermodal instead of people. It was discussed in detail in a Trains feature article.
The result was added mileage and transit time for intermodal across much of the CSX network.
From reading all the various articles about it over time in Trains, the recollection is that the hub and spoken aspect of it was what was shut down.
The terminal itself never closed and has continued operating instead primarily as a regional terminal with boxes drayed in and out.
North Baltimore is a four-hour-or-less dray from all the major cities in Ohio and Southern Michigan, and Indianapolis and even Lousiville, KY.
BNSF also worked out a haulage agreement from Chicago to North Baltimore and shows North Baltimore as the easternmost terminis of its intermodal network. (Longitudinally just a hair further east than Atlanta.)
So like the USS Lexington and USS Saratoga that were originally laid down as battlecruisers but were converted mid-construction to the first true combat-capable through-deck aircraft carriers after the 1922 Naval Treaty and served with great distinction as aircraft carriers, North Baltimore is serving successfully in a role different from the original purpose of its construction.
I am sure some of the industry insiders on this forum can give better information and correct any incorrect understandings that might be contained in this forum contribution.
In Hunter Harrison’s opinion North Baltimore wasn’t working well. That opinion was based on
I’ve always heard that UP wouldn’t pay more for the extra mileage the draying required to Chicago and environs. The truckers avoided doing business through Rochelle.
Rochelle may not be an intermodal terminal, but it’s still used for block swapping between trains. It almost became a home terminal for trains heading for Iowa.
About 20 years ago, the UP served Section 6 notices on all concerned about moving home crew terminals from Boone, Clinton, and Des Moines Iowa to Rochelle. The UP wished to establishe a Rochelle to Missouri Valley IA pool for the most important intermodal trains. Rochelle to Boone, Rochelle to Mason City IA, and a Rochelle to Des Moines, IA pools for all traffic. Negotiations resulted in the Rochelle to Boone pool to have the home terminal remain at Boone. All others to be Rochelle. East of Rochelle they would use crews to take trains to the various Chicago yards and interchange points with other railroads.
Nothing every happened. The talk about reshuffling runs lasted maybe a year at most. At the time it was probably an unrealistic goal. The biggest problem running through Clinton IA is the Mississippi River drawbridge. When the river is open for navigation, the delay to through trains would be too costly (time wise) for running such high mileage pools. At the time, just the Boone to Clinton crews were taking about 11 hours to make it. Often, they would not and need to be dog caught just short of Clinton. Besides the bridge opening up, congestion the closer a train got to the Chicago metro area stopped trains waiting to get in. I remember several times hearing that every parking spot that would hold a train was filled between Clinton and Proviso. And that was when trains were of a “normal” size.
Keeping Boone as home terminal for the one pool, which would’ve been the largest one, may or may not have kept me from having to move to I
I wonder about that whole TRAINS article. As the old adage goes…“hindsight is 20/20”. Investments in a company are a lot like stock investments sometimes. I particulary question the article entry that the Milwaukee Road Pacific Extension never should have been built. I love to beat that dead horse to death.
Maybe yes maybe no. I firmly believe it was the method in how it was built and the decisions made about it later on that sunk it’s fate. Sure the GN had better grades and all but another part of GN’s success was how it was built. It had a lot more land grants than the Milwaukee, it built far more extensively in the West than Milwaukee. GN built into Canada, and the inside gateway to California, that competed in part with Southern Pacific. GN also did some mainline revisements over Marias Pass. Milwaukee Road did none of that and took on a lot of debt that pushed it into bankruptcy more than once after construction (which probably had an impact with funding follow on route revisements). Additionally, not much as far as Western line devlopement compared with GN. A lot more branch lines than GN in the Midwest too. GN was slimmer in branch lines and I believe sold a few off, early on that were considered excess.
My view is the PE could have been a lot more successful if the construction wasn’t as rushed and did not exceed the budget as it had. Additionally, Milwaukee could as well have trimmed down a lot of it’s Midwestern branch line network a lot earlier than it did and moved more aggressively to compete in the far West. I still do not know if it would have made it. However, can’t say it never should have been built or it was a mistake. It is true it ended up being a financial albatross though.
I am sure from the inside the UP decision
When Global 3 opened in 2003, the world was a different place. The shipping world has evolved since then.
While the West Coast ports are always going to be busy, competition from the ever-expanding Prince Rupert and Roberts Bank Deltaport have changed traffic patterns to Chicago and the Midwest.
Oakland-Alameda is steady but is rarely mentioned in growth conversations.
Seattle-Tacoma is also steady but BNSF has made steady investments in the Northern Transcon to improve capacity, and if they ever clear Stampede Tunnel for doublestacks will continue to be very competitive to Chicago and the Midwest.
UP intermodal to Mexico with all the near shoring will continie to grow.
Obviously UP feels has determined Global 1 and 2 is sufficient to handle IM to the West Coast and Global 4 is best positioned to handle their USMCA traffic and has room to grow.
Great Northern did not get federal land grants when its Pacific Coast line was built.
UP still uses Global 3 as a block swapping yard. Every time I pass I see two or three trains there or nearby. The place is busy.
Since G3 was the outcome of community protest. I probably would’ve canned the project. UP finally got it right by expanding G2, and they’re not done yet. Eventually G2 will expand across more of the flat yard at Proviso pushing remaining blocking to G3.
How about the best ‘overall’ investment? I submit the 'Williams -Crookton Arizona 44 mile line change Santa Fe accomplished in 1959-1960. The original 1884 line had curve, grade and tunnel constraints requiring speeds of twenty MPH, or less.
Today’s BNSF southern ‘Transcon’ through this location has maximum 1% grades and one degree curves. Rock excavations exceeded 100 feet and fills were of over 100 feet. Amtrak’s #3 and #4 may do 90 MPH if desired and freight 70 MPH. The total cost was about twenty million dollars.
I think of the PCE as being the same late-era ‘Standard-Oil-money funded’ sort of project as the Virginian or the Key West Extension, with construction adjusted (a stronger word could certainly be used if desired) to accommodate associated interests and concerns. The usual refinancings or sqeezing out of early investors should have taken place at multiple times – but the principal stockholder interest made sure that didn’t happen (which would have sterilized at least a large part of the stranded costs). It was built to be operated as a single-track railroad for comparatively light, fast trains, arguably ideal for silk traffic, and was ill-suited to be rebuilt into a proper railroad even for CTC operation with all the line and grade corrections that, for example, ATSF engaged in. Likewise the obvious investment-that-should-have-made-the-greatest-difference, the bridging of the ‘gap’ between the electrified districts, could never seem to be financed… in my opinion there was a long time past the general end of the electric-railroad craze, indeed past the introduction of early road diesels, that it would have made eminent sense.
If the ATSF wound up with competitive problems because it was a mandatory 90mph railroad in an era that came not to value 90mph speed at the cost required, the PCE was slower and less well engineered with most of the same loss in perceived advantage.
I’d have liked to see what would have happened if the eastern extension had been given the necessary improvements for load and speed, and the PCE used as a container bridge line feeding it, at the same time that the railroad shucked its vast investment in obsolete branch and agricultural lines. This is not quite the same niche that MRL profitably occupied, but it might have proven similarly valuable for ‘adaptive re-use’ if preserved, much as MRL now has.
Of course I’m still bitter about losing the CASO, and the A&S together with all the infrastructure f
Reading Johnston’s book on the Milwaukee’s PCE, the story of Anaconda’s role in the PCE reminded me of Myrick’s history of the El Paso & Southwestern. Namely that Anaconda, as with the case with Phelps Dodge, wanted more competition in rail service.
The PCE alignment between Morbridge and Harlowton was pretty well done, and the Milwaukee line between Lewiston and Grass Range with a tunnel at the summit would have been better than the GN line which would have had two tunnels, albeit shorter than what would have been on the Milwaukee line. The Milwaukee line as built did not have the summit tunnel. This line was intended to be part of a short cut to Great Falls from the east, which would also have been part of through connection west via Caddotte’s pass.
Some predecessor routes for the GN were Land Grant, as were some predecessor routes for the Milwaukee. But as the actual Great Northern (and St. Paul, Minneapolis and Manitoba which was built as far west as Butte), no land grants. In reality, the Milwaukee benefited tremendously from land grants because the Northern Pacific (a Land Grant railroad) was already in place and much of the material and equipment to build the Milwaukee route was shipped on the NP. Stan Johnson’s book “The Milwaukee Road’s Western Extension” documents this well. Much easier and cheaper than shipping via the railroad being constructed. And while places like Butte were around even before the railroads, many of the communities like Miles City and Missoula became really established with the arrival of the Northern Pacific. Unlike when the NP was built, when the Milwaukee arrived at these places, vital services like medical care, law enforcement, and local governments were
Have always featured the Midwest is the area between the Appalachian Mountains and the Rocky Mountains.
(1) One hopes that the railroads hold onto some rational thought, long term planning and common sense (rapidly disappearing) on locations that accomodate longer trains and generous elbow room for lighter geometry track and clearances. The fear is the corporate suites where the financial low-life and the real estate get-rich-fast lowlifes are looking to make a fast buck by what they consider to be surplus property. Operating bubbas scream and howl every time a track is retired, even if it was only good for end-cab switchers and 40 ft. boxcars. The places where you can create space in an urban environment to start with a clean slate without huge land acquisition purposes and minimal NIMBY local government interference are pretty much gone. In the present, the R/E arms of at least 4 of the Cls 1’s are clueless and are focussed on short term gain to the detriment of the operating railroad.
(2) Eric & Monty’s comment needs to be stated with an asterisk or a caveat based on the Milwaukee PCE’s late arrival after 1900 (nominally 1905-1909). There was federal grant right of way on the line, but it was not pre-1872 grant R/W (Checkerboard plus 400’ wide corridor; alternate even or odd sections out to a 10 or 20 mile limit). It was some form of 1872-75 grant R/W [nominally 100-200 wide with extra width for station grounds]and only applied to non-patented vacant land held by the government…Which by 1900-1908 was very little where the railroads wanted to run. Most had been absorbed by timber companies, homesteaders, adjoining railroads et al that had to finalize their claims by 1902-04 or risk losing those rights by federal rule. If you look at GLO tract books (Or BLM Historical Index (HI) and Master Title Plats (MTP), the mad scramble by UP, NP, GN, OR&N, SP and others is clearly evident. The blanket/ over-generalized comments/assertion on GN not using land grants could stand a fact check - how do they suppose the railroads got across vacant land still in government possession w
Nearby Rogers Pass was about 500’ lower. What would have made Caddotte’s Pass a more preferred choice?
Back on the subject of questionable yard investment, UP was a partner in the Mid-Willamette Valley Intermodal Center in Millersburg, Oregon built last year. I see headlines that it has never had business, but the articles were behind a paywall. Does anyone know what’s happening there?