I just finished reading Big Brown, by Greg Niemann. This book is a 210 page history of UPS, written by a former employee (worked in public affairs).
I was somewhat disappointed in that it really seemed like a company sponsered history. Not a bad book, but it really didnt get into many struggles or details. The overwhelming theme seemed to be “Jim Casey was a visionary and he changed the world.” I do not doubt that, but surely there must have been issues and challenges.
That being said, the last couple of chapters of the book were outstanding. Those dealt with the technology pushed out by UPS and how it transformed the company. We have all seen the devices UPS drivers carry around and most of us have signed them. The technology behind those, plus the behind the scenes uses makes this an outstanding insight into a very private company.
I emailed the author asking about UPS’s relationship with railroads. The book only makes a couple of statements about that relationship. I even asked that Mr. Niemann consider writing a book specifically dealing with the UPS/railroad relationship.
That is a book which is missing from shelves these days. My feelings is that UPS’s private nature will keep it from being written. The most detailed accounting of this history was a 3 part series in the EL Historical magazine which had great info about the EL handling of UPS trailers back in the 1970s.
Overall, I would recommend this book, primarily for the look at today’s UPS, as outlined above, but unfortunately the author didnt explore the company more deeply…or perhaps that was part of the deal when he wrote the book…
You hit the nail on the head when you said the company can be rather private. I worked for UPS for several Christmas seasons(Start the day after Thanksgiving and get laid off by New Years) as a delivery driver. They had '‘everything’ mapped out and you did it by the book. A very impressive operation. The last Chrismas season I worked for them they said that I might bet picked up ‘full-time’ after the next season. A month later, I was hired by a large computer company and have been there for 33 years. A friend drives for UPS still.
Up until about 10-12 years ago, they would not allow their logo to be used on any plastic model. What broke the ice was their entry into NASCAR sponsorship.
Their ‘train’ operations really took off when they found that they could reduce costs using the Santa Fe ‘trans-con’. They were concerned about rough handling and the president of UPS was invited to ride a business car on a Santa Fe TOFC - He was impressed enough to start routing Chicago -LA traffic via rail.
I have worked with the UPS MIS folks for a number of years - They are demanding, but also realize that ‘bleeding edge’ technology has a steep learning curve. They try to stay on the ‘leading edge’, not the ‘bleeding edge’ if possible…
Excellent point, and I think pretty much on target. I’ll as our librarian to see if she can order it int. I worked for UPS when they first arried in Memphis,Tn. 71/72, in their Morning Sort while I was going to College. At that time about all we had were a few computer generated list of inbound equipment. We had two full -time drivers who worked and sorted by memory our in-bound packages by writing the truck number on each package. The part-timers pulled the stuff off the belt and placed it in the ‘package car’ in the delivery order of the route. [UPS Stone-age.] If you got it wrong the drivers would"Tell You" the next day when they arrived to start their routes.
Later in my career I was fortunate enough to be able to work with and observe FED EX’s operations ( from outside their employ) but for a large contractor with an excellent, inter-corporate relationship, as well as with FedEx and also with several other Over-night Package Carriers { DHL, Airborne,UPS,Emery, Burlington Package,Flying Tigers] . Interestingly, although they developed independently and had different Corporate models, the, UPS and Fed Ex have evolved very similarly. Technologies applicable to both models have been developed and employed in very similar user functions by each company.
I am not sure of the time-lines for UPS to use rail for long distance deliveries of the ‘Third day+’’ class of packages. But, my guess is that they were in it just before J.B> Hunt jumped in to it ( also at the Behest of BNSF(?). UPS tested the waters for some time before they made a regular commitment. FedEX is relatively new to the rail movement, they tested using non time critical freight ( had much after they ‘merged’ Flying Tigers and American Freightways ( nee: Arkansas Freightways, Harrison ,Ark.) into their Corporate Family. Now I see Fed E
Interesting topic. I’m pretty sure UPS was using intermodal quite a bit before JB Hunt, way back to the pre-Staggers days. EL held the NY-Chicago lane with their hottest intermodal trains and PC couldn’t pry the business away with a crow bar! So, this business goes back at least to the early 70s.
As for their relationship with the RR, it runs deep. I have a retired UPS operations exec living in my neighborhood and he STILL pokes me about train service even though he’s been out a couple of years and I don’t have any direct influence…
An anecdote from my Conrail days: The hottest of hot UPS trains was the once-a-week on Friday TV80. It came out of Chicago for North Bergen and had stuff to be delivered on Monday. I guess it was business oriented quasi-overnight stuff. One day, it was running about 3 hours early, but got held out of North Bergen. The UPS facility was tracking the train’s progress, saw the headlight at the yard limit and sent over the drivers. The train finally yarded about an hour ahead of schedule, but UPS was furious!
Thanks for jumping on and contributing on this subject. My “review” probably seemed a bit negetive, but I was expecting more…the subtitle was “The Untold Story.” It was a fluff piece, but still was worth reading. As previously stated, the last couple of chapters were outstanding. For instance…
Today, UPS is providing “repair” service for electronics products in Louisville, Ky. It is part of the entire movement of defective product from customer to “repair facility” and back to customer.
I never understood the Mail Boxes, Etc purchase, now “The UPS Store” until reading the book. UPS obviously excels at business to business service, as both b’s have shpping/receiving departments and are set up for this. Business to consumer is a bit more complex, as there is usually just one parcel delivered and hopefully the consumer is home. A consumer to business is another animal. Packaging, forms, etc. to be filled out. With a local “store” the consumer goes there and gets help. Pickup costs are greatly reduced on a difficult aspect of logistics, but something that is growing. I go into the local store from time to time for shipping or copies, etc. The manager indicates they do a HUGE volume. Think about it…charging the highest rate for parcels without a residential pickup. Plus, all the extra services. The UPS Store now makes sense.
The UPS technology (the book written in 2006) seems pretty simple, yet complex. Anytime a pickup is generated (labels are generated and data entered into the system when scanned), a routing plan is made, complete with final delivery. This seems simple, but with millions of packages daily, consider the complexities.
The UPS/railroad book is something which I doubt will ever be written. I cannot see UPS opening up nor do I see UPS allowing the railroads to provide such info. As it is now, stand trackside
If you can get hold of a copy of “Piggyback and Containers” by David J. DeBoer it will be worth your time.
DeBoer was “There” for the development of modern rail intermodal. He devotes a short chapter to the development of the UPS/railroad relationship. According to DeBoer the big step was when UPS expanded into Florida from the Northeast and Midwest in 1966. First big move was on the old Seaboard Coast Line. UPS always wanted truck competitive service in lieu of lower prices.
DeBoer worked in railroad marketing departments and for the FRA. He wound up as a senior marketing guy for Greebrier (They sold double stack cars.)
**ED; [MP173] quoted: “…**I never understood the Mail Boxes, Etc purchase, now “The UPS Store” until reading the book. UPS obviously excels at business to business service, as both b’s have shpping/receiving departments and are set up for this. Business to consumer is a bit more complex, as there is usually just one parcel delivered and hopefully the consumer is home. A consumer to business is another animal. Packaging, forms, etc. to be filled out. With a local “store” the consumer goes there and gets help. Pickup costs are greatly reduced on a difficult aspect of logistics, but something that is growing. I go into the local store from time to time for shipping or copies, etc. The manager indicates they do a HUGE volume. Think about it…charging the highest rate for parcels without a residential pickup. Plus, all the extra services. The UPS Store now makes sense…”
UPS bought Mail Boxes, ETC. in March 2001. and Fed Ex bought Kinko’s in December of 2004 for a reported $2 4 Billion!
I refer back to a previous statement. I would ascribe it to the Corporate Model Thingie again. What is good fpor one Package Service is good for the other, That’s competition. FedEx’s Corporate Super Hub is Memphis,Tn. and right across the road (Winchester Ave) is the UPS Hub at the airport. The UPS Super Hub is at Louisville,KY. It will be the same with competition for their railroad business. as well as their technologies.
I would guess that at some point in the future, a merger on some level [:^)]would be advantageous for both companies. [2c] In the 1980’s and early 1990’s wo
I seriously doubt if a UPFX merger would ever occur. The anti trust dept of justice would probably not allow that to occur. The network requirements to build another such competitor is not feasible and would require massive $$$ and considerable time. Look how DHL dropped out of US a few years ago.
Roadway/Yellow were kings of LTL years ago, particularly Roadway. However, the non union LTLs just kept chipping away, particularly Conway. When CF fell (who would have envisioned that in 1980?) the writing was on the wall.
I agree. Merging FedEx and UPS would be like merging Coke and Pepsi. It ain’t gonna’ happen. Their operations models may converge, after all, what’s good is good. But they’ll be competitive carriers providing a range of excellent services into the foreseeable future. (Probably beyond that.)
The historical structure of LTL trucking was not a natural one. The “Regular Route Carriers” (the LTL carriers) were structured to be railroads with rubber tires. When the Federal Government regulated some motor freight (maybe 30%) in 1935 my favorite regulatory villain, Joseph B. Eastman, took charge of structuring the industry.
He didn’t know squat about trucking (or transportation for that matter), so he set up the LTL carriers to look like railroads. Pick up/Delivery vehicles would service terminals where freight would be transferred to/from line haul vehicles. These line haul trucks would move over very specific highway routes to other terminals where the frreight would be broken out into more delivery vehicles. Just like a railroad.
This was a denial of one of the great advantages of trucking, flexibility. The chosen carriers (entry was greatly restricted) and their union made out like bandits while the American economy and people suffered with inefficient transp
The Best Transportation System in the World
Railroads,Trucks, Airlines, and American Public
Policy in the Twentieth Century, Mark H. Rose • Bruce E. Seely • Paul F. Barrett 2006.
The authors suggest that Eastman wanted to see the development of integrated intermodal transportation firms allowed, rather than the prevailing policy of separations for rail, trucking, air and water carriers, which each favored to prevent intrusion by companies outside the modality. And he favored a single regulatory body.
“Suggest” is certainly the right word. They mention this in passing, but provide no discussion.
First, I’d like to point out that my post did not deal in any way with intermodal coordination. I only stated that Eastman structured an important part of the trucking industry (LTL) when it came under Federal economic regulation. He got it drastically wrong and we suffered for decades due to his induced inefficiencies. The government should have just let the trucking industry develop on its own. It would have configured itself into the most effecient model, with some miscues along the way. To think that some government agency could sit down and effectively design an industry that had never existed before is just plain silly.
Eastman may have said he favored integrated transportation companies, but where are the examples of actions on his part to facilitate such integration? I don’t know of any. If you do know of such actions, please let me know. The authors do not say anywhere that I have found that the railroads resisted integration with other transportation modes. Again, if I’ve missed something here, I’ll go back and read it again. In all reality neither Eastman or his commission should have had any power to prevent the integration, but they did.
True. I was only able to read the first chapter. As you say, they suggested it was the truck lines and fledgling airlines that resisted cross-modal efforts, not the railroads, some of whom, of course, did seek to enter the other modalities or even did so, if only briefly.
The authors do seem to have a bias toward planning, such as the USRA and Ripley’s merger plans.
I don’t see that bias. They flat out do say that regulation was political, not “scientific” or objective.
I also don’t know what you mean by “briefly”. Railroads sought to become integrated intermodal transportation companies as almost soon as the internal cumbustion engine was put on wheels to carry freight or given wings. They were integrating right after World War One. Eastman and his fellow commissioners began to roll that back in 1931 with In The Matter of Container Service (173 ICC 377) and added ridiculous restrictions on rail-truck integration through the following decade.
As with Eastman’s wrong headed structuring of LTL trucking, this “Planning” cost Americans dearly.
Railroads were allowed to keep some regular route trucking operations that had been established before the 1935 law that brought Federal economic regulation to trucking. SP had a big trucking operation, Pacific Motor Trucking. Santa Fe had Santa Fe Trails. Rock Island had Rock Island Motor Transport, etc. These regular route motor carriers died with the rest of their kind. It wasn’t a brief flirtation. But it was never allowed to grow to anywhere near its full potential.
At the ICG, we had a bus company. Gulf Transport (it came with the GM&O) ran busses daily beween St. Louis and Mobile. If you remember the old Trailways Bus Company you should know that it came out of Santa Fe Trail. Yes, the Santa Fe Railroad started the Trailways Bus
The reason I said what I said is because the authors’ views are contradictory to 1. Your portrayal of Eastman, and 2. Your thesis of government regulation imposed from without against the wishes and/or interests of the affected industries. I was being generous to you in suggesting a bias by the authors. I fail to see how you can possibly believe they support your thesis. This can be seen in these statements below, made from the beginning in the preface:
“Starting in the 1920s, we learned, many in and out of government began to envision an alternative
transportation regime, one that would permit railroads to own truck and
airline firms, leading to formation of transportation companies. ICC commissioner
Joseph B. Eastman and other advocates of creating transportation
firms (rather than railroad, airline, and trucking companies) urged that
operators of those intermodal transportation firms would fall under the
purview of a single federal regulatory agency, not several of them.”
"Ironies abounded. For example, like their counterparts in trucking, during the 1930s, railroad and airline executives organized to fight in courts and Congress against truckers and
one another with a view toward protecting their share of freight and passenger
traffic. Those would-be individualists working at railroad and airline
firms never grew fatigued of repeating historical narratives
that highlighted the problems of unfair competition. Most importantly,
by the mid-1930s, leaders of airline firms had joined their counterparts
in the trucking field to conclude that government regulation
represented the best and only answer to competitive pressure and especially
to the real threat that railroad leaders would enter or “invade” trucking and
airline operations with their own trucks and aircraft. In reality, government
at every level had subsidized the railroad, trucking, and airline businesses;
and in fact, those bus
The reason I said what I said is because the authors’ views are contradictory to 1. Your portrayal of Eastman, and 2. Your thesis of government regulation imposed from without against the wishes and/or interests of the affected industries. I was being generous to you in suggesting a bias by the authors. I fail to see how you can possibly believe they support your thesis. This can be seen in these statements below, made from the beginning in the preface:
“Starting in the 1920s, we learned, many in and out of government began to envision an alternative
transportation regime, one that would permit railroads to own truck and
airline firms, leading to formation of transportation companies. ICC commissioner
Joseph B. Eastman and other advocates of creating transportation
firms (rather than railroad, airline, and trucking companies) urged that
operators of those intermodal transportation firms would fall under the
purview of a single federal regulatory agency, not several of them.”
"Ironies abounded. For example, like their counterparts in trucking, during the 1930s, railroad and airline executives organized to fight in courts and Congress against truckers and
one another with a view toward protecting their share of freight and passenger
traffic. Those would-be individualists working at railroad and airline
firms never grew fatigued of repeating historical narratives
that highlighted the problems of unfair competition. Most importantly,
by the mid-1930s, leaders of airline firms had joined their counterparts
in the trucking field to conclude that government regulation
represented the best and only answer to competitive pressure and especially
to the real threat that railroad leaders would enter or “invade” trucking and
airline operations with their own trucks and aircraft. In reality, government
at every level had subsidized the railroad, trucking, and airline business
“You seem to keep changing the point. The fact is that the Federal economic regulators, including Eastman, largely blocked the development of integrated transportation companies. Nothing the authors say contradicts that.”
Really? So what did the authors mean by this statement?
“ICC commissioner Joseph B. Eastman and other advocates of creating transportation firms (rather than railroad, airline, and trucking companies) urged that operators of those intermodal transportation firms would fall under the purview of a single federal regulatory agency, not several of them.”
I don’t necessarily dispute your contention that the ICC blocked integration. But the authors do not put the blame on Eastman (and other advocates) as you do. The authors are saying above that the airlines and trucking industry used influence to get the ICC to block the rails from using their own trucks and airplanes to invade their modalities. You may well believe something else and you may be correct. But the authors of the book I cited do not blame Eastman.