If there are problems with the link, look for “Mapa de la exploracion de cuatro vias entre Lima, Juaja y Pasco” in the Rumsey collection (Verify Access).
Here is the profile:
You can see the logic: the thin line, with mountains above it, is an idealization of the thalweg (valley-line); the thick line above it is a (simplified version of) the proposed rail. The simplest interpretation - is there a different one? - is that the rail goes up on a hillside cut well
before the slope becomes too large; when the slope does become > 4% (in this map, after San Damian), it starts going gradually down to the valley floor, keeping a guiding grade of 3.5% or even increasing it slightly. It then tunnels, goes above a second valley (“Valle del Rio Mala”), etc.
(The thin line/thick line reading seems to be confirmed by other texts from the time: an alternative proposal by Edmond Roy, Backus’s profile for the extension of the Sewanee railroad, etc. What is a thick line here would usually be a red line.)
Everything you are telling me is relevant, though in the following way. The plan that was actually followed was not Backus’s - either in the preliminary form you see here or in the March 1866 version that I hope to get from the archives in the summer. Rather, Ernest Malinowski - who came from an different tradition - French grandes écoles: Polytechnique, Ponts et Chausées - was put solely in charge of choosing the route, and also was at the head of the more than 20-year effort to executing the plan. He used every device under the sun, including plenty of switchbacks, a turntable, etc. As much as he and the engineers he led are respected for the execution (the train is still in operation as a cargo train) his route choice was much questioned at the time.
(The entire decision procedure was set in place by the notorious Henry Meiggs, who is said to have essentially ignored previous studies, and told the state “I will have one of your engineers (Malinowski) do a new study, and, if you grant me the commission, I won’t charge you”. my strong suspicion is that Backus acknowledged in March 1866 that there was a cartographic mistake in his map, due to inherited longitude errors, and that his plan was more difficult than it had appeared at first; Meiggs may have seen this as inconclusive - and I take that quick decisions were as much of his modus operandi as enormous bribes. But that’s a matter for another day.)
The matter has been mentioned in the historiography from time to time, but it would seem nobody has taken a real technical look at the what-if question since the early 1870s. So, I’d like to understand thoroughly what Backus was actually proposing, and what were the actual technical reasons against it. I also suspect some non-engineers involved may have misunderstood the proposal, though the gist of it seems clear just from the map and profile. That is why I am also asking whether it was unprecedented.
(Malinowski wrote a report comparing the two options, but it is only so useful: it reads like motivated reasoning, which it was. It was submitted - without a map or profile - only more than a week after the state put out a call for tenders based on his route choice. Malinowski mentions what would seem to be the strongest point against Backus’s plan only in passing, acknowledging that his route has the same problem. The entire matter was plagued with irregularities even by 19th century Peruvian standards, but that’s, again, another matter.
Edmund Roy, by the way, was a French engineer who criticized M.'s proposal and would have preferred a narrow-gauge line going above yet a different valley.)