Where do you see that? I don’t see it in this thread except for maybe in the article linked to the first post.
Wabash, I was referring to the tapes in the dispatching office. When we had a wreck or injury, we pulled the tapes within a matter of minutes. The NTSB doesn’t pull the tapes, the railroad does.
I think GCOR is clear. Do you?
RWM
At variance with this thread so far, the conductor, as the sole surviving crew member of the September Metrolink crash, claims the last two signals were green. And that is why the last two signals were not called out over the radio.
As stated by officials of the NTSB, it is a violation of the Metrolink rules to not call out green signals. But, it appears to be a cultural thing; with most railroaders not calling out clear signals, possibly inspired by previous railroad employment practices.
It would seem to me that the tell-tale indicator would be the dispatcher’s and locomotives’ recordings. If in fact green signals are customarily not called out, there should be few signal call-outs on all the tapes related to the disastrous run of Train 111.
Dispatcher’s “recordings” only record the radio towers that the dispatcher is using or listening to because they are recordings of the dispatcher, not general radio traffic. A dispatcher may have a 100 phone lines, intercoms, radio towers, etc. available to him, but will only have one or two on at any given time. So unless the dispatcher just happened to be using a radio tower that was within range of the train, there would be no recording of the signals being called out. The engines do not record radio conversations.
My eyes tend to glaze over reading these descriptions of rules such as
you may proceed after a stop and proceed signal if the previous signal had bird droppings on it and the 3rd signal is a flashing yellow on alternate Tuesdays
I really can’t figure how anybody can keep them straight, yet at least one poster here said the rules are straightforward.
My eyes also glaze over when I read posts about the various remote control methods and their abreviations. Maybe I need to read the ABC’s of railroading to figure CTC, ATO, ATC, PTC and OMGOSH. Anyway, is there, or has anybody thought of a system like this: the engineer punches in a code that acknowledges the signal aspect. If it doesn’t agree with what the computer thinks the aspect should be it gets recorded for review. If it isn’t the same as, or more restrictive than what the computer thinks then the train stops.
I remember a John Kneiling Professional Iconoclast article that had a similar theme for remote control. 2 crew members had the remote control box, it had 4 buttons, slow forward, slower forward, slow reverse and stop. Unless each crew member pressed the same button, or if either control box lost went out of radio range, the locomotive stopped.
Now for the idea that it’s better for dispatchers to broadcast all meets, and it’s better for every crew to hear these announcements. That’s kind of like the idea that you send an email to everybody on the list, even if they’re only peripherally involved in the subject. You wind up distracting some folks from more germaine duties, you run the risk of a “cry wolf” situation, “I just heard 20 announcements about a meet on a parallel line” so the engineer doesn’t pay attention to the 21st announcement which concerns a move on his line, or at the junction he’s coming to. Certainly if the announcement is the dispatcher screaming "Holy crap, trains xxx and yyy are gonna have
[quote user=“gardendance”]
My eyes tend to glaze over reading these descriptions of rules such as
you may proceed after a stop and proceed signal if the previous signal had bird droppings on it and the 3rd signal is a flashing yellow on alternate Tuesdays
I really can’t figure how anybody can keep them straight, yet at least one poster here said the rules are straightforward.
My eyes also glaze over when I read posts about the various remote control methods and their abreviations. Maybe I need to read the ABC’s of railroading to figure CTC, ATO, ATC, PTC and OMGOSH. Anyway, is there, or has anybody thought of a system like this: the engineer punches in a code that acknowledges the signal aspect. If it doesn’t agree with what the computer thinks the aspect should be it gets recorded for review. If it isn’t the same as, or more restrictive than what the computer thinks then the train stops.
I remember a John Kneiling Professional Iconoclast article that had a similar theme for remote control. 2 crew members had the remote control box, it had 4 buttons, slow forward, slower forward, slow reverse and stop. Unless each crew member pressed the same button, or if either control box lost went out of radio range, the locomotive stopped.
Now for the idea that it’s better for dispatchers to broadcast all meets, and it’s better for every crew to hear these announcements. That’s kind of like the idea that you send an email to everybody on the list, even if they’re only peripherally involved in the subject. You wind up distracting some folks from more germaine duties, you run the risk of a “cry wolf” situation, “I just heard 20 announcements about a meet on a parallel line” so the engineer doesn’t pay attention to the 21st announcement which concerns a move on his line, or at the junction he’s coming to. Certainly if the announcement is the dispatcher screaming “Holy crap, trains xxx and yyy are gonna have a cornfield meet, everybody stop immediately” I
SEPTA operates under it’s own tracks, AMTRAK’s and I believe CSX’s and/or Norfolk Southern’s tracks and/or dispatching. I heard one SEPTA engineer say that he needed to know everybody’s rules, and there were some requirements on one which would be violations on another.
Regarding the use of radio as an overlay of operating information:
On one hand, the idea of broadcasting operating information seems like it would help communication even though it may duplicate signal indications. If the communication is as important as this is, why not reinforce it with every means available?
On the other hand, the more avenues of information transmission, the greater the chance of them not agreeing, and the emergence of the question as to which avenue has the ultimate authority.
I recall a short article in Trains back in the 1970s about a wreck on the PC where a freight train ran a red signal at a Bascule bridge, and struck the counterweight of the bridge. The article mentioned that the accident would shine light on the new, emerging issue of defining the authority of radio transmissions in controlling trains. I don’t have the article in front of me, so I am going by memory.
When the approaching train was some distance (perhaps a few miles) away, the bridge operator lined up for the t
What’s confusing is that many people are quoting the wrong rules, rules from different rule books, rules that are associated with different track authorities, obsolete rules, rules for the wrong type of train and then there are all the people who have never been qualified on the rules trying to hold a rules class and getting things anywhere from 5% to 50% right. By the time its all said and done its pretty confusing missmash of a thread. Its a lot simpler than it seems, but rumors don’t fair well in clarity, so in order for all these other alternative scenarios to flourish people have to get the water as muddy as possible.
The signal at the switch the Metro train ran through should have been an absolute signal, right? The dispatcher should have seen that. What would he see if the train runs through that? Does anything come up on his screen in that case? I know many different areas have many different systems, and even what happens after a train runs a red depends on where it’s at and teh system in place.
And I still wonder if anyone knows exactly what signals were what color, and whether teh engineer was mandated to be prepared to stop on HIS line, even if he did see a clear signal. Even before teh rules debate begins, I still can’t understand what the conditions were before the collision, and there seem to be different “reports” on how things were. Is there anything solid to go on yet? When’s the NTSB supposed to come out, or haven’t they given a date yet? No, I don’t consider “media” reports solid, for obvious reasons.
I’m only quessing but I’m not sure that the dispatcher would see anything different if the red was ran because another train was already in the block just around the corner. How would the system “know” that the switch was run. At this point in time, can the “system” tell if a block is occupied at one end or the other? I know that train speed and direction are calculated in the timing of the gates at grade crossings but does anybody know if that applies to block occupation?
It is.
Dispatchers cannot see signal indications.
Between 1 and 15 seconds after a train enters a control point (the amount of time depending upon the latency of the signal and communications system), the dispatcher’s screen will show an occupancy in the control point. Occupancies, or “track lights,” are shown as a change in color in the track line graphic, usually from white (controlled track, no occupancy) to red (controlled track, occupancy). After a train enters the next block beyond a control point, that block’s track light will also turn from white to red, if it is unoccupied. But in this case it was occupied so it would already be red. If the dispatcher happens to be looking at that control point on his screen at that moment, he would see it turn color and know that something was abnormal. Otherwise during his next normal scan of the console screens he would likely see the color change as it would be an unexpected condition.
Nothing other than the track light. The train ID may or may not move with the train in a case like this. Some computer-aided dispatching systems now have as an option an error message appearing on the screen to alert the dispatcher that an unexpected condition has occurred. The dispatcher has to click to acknowledge the message before he can do anything else with the console. The error messages are more trouble than they are worth, in my opinion, as there are h
Signal systems detect a “shunt” in a track circuit. A track circuit consists of two rails between two sets of insulated joints. Generally a track circuit is the same distance as a block. A block generally extends between two signals. A shunt can be a train entering the block, or a broken rail, or a jumper cable between the two rails. Signal systems are not designed to detect where in the block the shunt occurs.
A grade-crossing signal system using a Grade Crossing Predictor (not all grade crossing signal systems are so equipped) measures change in frequency of a signal compared to time, and from that calculates speed of the train. If the speed is negative, the train is moving away from the crossing. Your question implies if that could be done for a block signal system. The answer is yes, but it would be of no value.
RWM
So back to my original question. Then there would have been no indication that the switch was run because the block was already “shunted” by the oncoming train, right?
Right. The dispatcher’s board would show the block occupied by the freight and could not descern a second train enterning from the opposite end. However, when the first block (occuped by the passenger train in this instance) was vacated the dispatchers’ board should have shown that. But remember in this instance we are talking about events that happened in about 20 seconds so it is probably not pertinent as to what the dispatcher could determine or react to; it was too late.
Perhaps someone can explain how the conductor knew “the last two signals were green” if they were not called out by the engineer. (I presume the reference is to the two signals preceding the one displaying red at the crash site.) Maybe one, but certainly not both, signals could be seen by the conductor as he stood on the station platform at Chatsworth. I take it that the purpose of the rule requiring the engin
No sir. Look at my previous post this morning. A train passing end of siding, whether on main track or siding, first occupies the block that consists of the control point itself, aka the OS – the distance of track between the facing signals, before it occupies the block beyond the control point. Each OS block has its own track light (the track schematic graphic turns from white to red) and it turns color on the dispatcher’s screen. It is as obvious.to the dispatcher looking at the screen that the OS is indicating an occupancy.
An occupancy is associated with a train ID. The ID “follows” the occupancy on the dispatcher’s screen as an assumption and convenience. The signal system of course does not know which train is where, nor does it need to know that. It only looks at occupancies and uses its logic to display signal indications based on what’s occupied or what’s not. When a train passes a control point on the dispatcher’s console and travels beyond the OS to enter the next block beyond the CP, the ID jumps to follow it, usually. But sometimes not. The ID is just a convenience for the di
Yes the dispatcher may have been able to tell that the switch had been run through. Switches have indicators to tell if the switch is lined and locked for a particular route. When the switch is not lined and locked the OS will flash and the signals will not clear for the route through the switch. After a dual control switch at a CP is run through, normall the mechanism is damaged and so it is not “lined and locked” causing the display on the dispatcher’s panel to flash. The switch is considered “out of correspondence”. A switch going out of correspondence under a train is usualy always a very, very bad sign. In this particular case, by the time the dispatcher could identify there was a problem the collision had probably occurred.
The purpose of the annoucing the signals is to broadcast the position of the train to any other trains or employees in the area. There is no “audio record” of local radio communications. The only audio record is of communications between the dispatcher and whoever he talks to or whatever radio/phone he has on at the moment. If he wasn’t listening to the Chatsworth radio, then there is NO record of the radio conversations at Chatsworth.
The delayed in the block rule is silent on station stops (its quoted a couple pages ago).
The requirements under the GCOR rule 9.9 in effect are that in CTC if the train has entered the block on a proceed indication that does not require restricted speed and the train stops or its speed drops below 10 mph, the train must proceed prepared to stop at the next signal. The train must maintain that speed until can see the next signal, the track is clear to the signal and the next signal displays a proceed indication.
So unless Metrolink has a General Order or special instruction modifying the rules there is absolutely nothing in the rule about a station stop and yes it plays no part in the discussion so there is no point debating it.
Thanks for clearing that up for me. I was wondering if there was something I wasn’t thinking about.