Found this on the Model Railroader Forum. It is the Official California PUC UP - MetralLink head on accident investigation report. It is a PDF file. VERY Interesting. LOTS of photos with captions.
Thanks. Essentially all photos & diagrams with captions, but very informative.
Very tragic for all involved, too.
-Paul North.
The PUC is nothing in this investigation, they are useless as udders on a bull.
Their report other than good pictures have no value and a lot of wrong info already re-canted by NTSB.
The PUC other than just justifying their existence have no reason to put out a report.
I found it interesting, one thing I had not seen before was the location of the Metrolinks engineers body, namely it appears to be outside the cab, under the engine? I have to wonder, in those last 4 second, if instead of putting it into emergency, if he instead tried to bail out of the cab and was caught under the wreckage in the crash, I doubt that type of initial impact would have thrown him sideways though that side window and I have never seen a Metrolink running with the cab door open. In the recent BNSF head-on caught on dash-camera, the crew on the other train can also be seen bailing out of the cab just seconds before impact.
Vic,
Of course it’s impossible to say for sure, but my guess would be that most, if not all, engineers would react first by dumping the air, then bailing.
Over the years I’ve had a few situations develop where my ‘train’ of thought was along the lines of, “Oh crap! Is that truck/switch engine going to move?” After those thoughts bounced around in my head for about .0005 seconds, my hand was on the brake handle, and I would mentally prepare myself for a quick exit. But my first thought ALWAYS was to dump the air first, then jump. Fortunately, I never had to implement the second part of my plan.
Compare the photo on page 10 of 30 with the one on page 24 of 30 - on 24 you can see where the roof of the cab was cut away (oxygen-acetylene torch or similar, probably, judging from the ragged edge of the cut and the gray-white discoloration from the heat), much closer to the point of crudely painted orange arrow (standard rescue & recovery procedure, I know) than on 10. That would lead me to believe that most or all of his body was still in the cab.
Photo on 19 of 30 shows how the heavy off-track wrecking equipment (Cat side-booms) dragged the Metro locomotive about 2 lengths to the northeast - and turned it over onto its other side ! - to allow the rescue and recovery to proceed in the telescoped passenger car. Also shows the “rigging” precautions to stabilize that car - a huge excavator on the far side reaching over, around, and under the opposite (towards the camera) “opened-up” side of the car to hold it with the bucket, and a large front-end loader on the near side to brace it, both to keep it from either turning over further or sliding down the embankment.
Photo on page 12 of 30 also shows a small forest (about 6) of the Cat side-booms ready to start moving the leading overturned UP locomotive - note that the trailing loco and freight cars have already been removed. Also, there’s a huge Cat wheel loader in the foreground, approaching the Metro locomotive.
- Paul North.
The PUC report seemed nothing more than a bunch of pictures of themselves trying to look official at the accident scene, and to justify their positions…
in other news, the NTSB said the Metrolink Engineer sent a text message 22 seconds before the accident…which would put him near the red signal (In my opinion)
http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-crash2-2008oct02,0,4888640.story
Nothing more an nothing less…just pictures to say we had personnel there.
Concur. The 42 MPH reported speed of the MetroLink train - at 1.47 ft./ sec per 1 MPH (= 5,280 ft. /mile divided by 3,600 secs. per hour) would be about 62 ft./ sec. In 22 seconds, it would travel about 1,364 feet - maybe a little less, since it might still have been acceleerating from the station stop.
The detailed Map: How the Crash Happened - “Metrolink Crash Deconstructed” (diagram 3 of 3) on the LA Times website - http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-traincrash-sg,0,5866154.storygallery indicates that the distance from the red signal to the crash site is just under the length of the “bar scale” on that map, which is labeled as 0.25 mile, which is 1,320 feet.
1,364 ft. vs. 1,320 ft. - draw your own conclusions.
- Paul North.
At some point during all the news coverage, I thought I heard that one of the UP crew did jump, but I heard no elaboration or even any other mention beyond that one report.
no they rode it out, they only had two seconds from seeing the metrolink to impact.
hardly enough time to dump air and say " ohh shit"
here is Latest NTSB report, note accident happend at 16:23 0r 4:23PM.
NTSB ADVISORY
National Transportation Safety Board
Washington , DC 20594
October 1, 2008
UPDATE: NTSB’S INVESTIGATION OF THE METROLINK, UNION PACIFIC
ACCIDENT IN CALIFORNIA
The following is an update of the NTSB’s investigation of
the September 12, 2008 accident in Chatsworth, California
involving a Metrolink commuter train and a Union Pacific
freight train. As a result of the head-on collision, there
were 25 fatalities and numerous injuries.
Information regarding the Metrolink engineer’s cell phone
activity on the day of the accident was obtained from his
service provider under subpoena from the NTSB. As part of
the ongoing investigation, this information is being used to
determine the timing of cell phone activity, which includes
text messaging to and from the engineer’s cell number, in
relation to the engineer’s duty hours and train operations.
Although the precise timing and correlation of these events
is still underway at the Safety Board’s Recorder Laboratory,
preliminary information is being released regarding the
approximate cell phone activity during the engineer’s duty
hours on the day of the accident.
On the day of the accident, the Metrolink engineer was on
duty for
If this is true, then what’s really something to think about is the fact that during his first stint operating the train he handled 45 text messages. Yet no problems there, significantly less the second time around and disaster. It only takes a brief moment, should be interesting to see the final conclusions, whenever that is.
I think you’ve got it.
The Cal PUC report puts the point of collision 1,462 feet past the signal. At 42 MPH this would have been 23.73 seconds past the signal. If he sent the text message 22 seconds before the collision he would have been past the signal when he sent it. A reasonable conclusion is that he was texting right up to the signal and “possibly” distracted from it.
Greyhounds -
Thanks for the exact distance. I couldn’t find it quickly in the limited time I had available last night. I concur with your analysis, reasoning, and conclusion, at least until better evidence shows up.
Also, lest anyone think that my calculated/ estimated distances are exact to the foot - they’re not, for a variety of numerical, graphical, and physical reasons too numerous and complex to go into detail here. For the moment, I’d say they’re good to +/- 50 to 100 ft., which is close enough for this purpose.
- Paul North.
Has anyone heard who well the UP engines event recorder clock was sync’ed with NBS time? I’m pretty sure that the cell phone system time is derived from GPS data (and accurate to a few tens of nanoseconds), if the event recorder’s clock is also derived from GPS input, then the “22 second” reported time interval is probably accurate, otherwise I wouldn’t put too much faith in the interval being 22 seconds.
Assuming that the interval from sending the text message to collision was 22 seconds, I would agree with the scenario that the engineer missed the signal due to texting. Don’t get me started about drivers distracted by cell phones and - even worse - texting. Funny thing is that it is probably a lot less distracting to send and receive Morse code while driving than texting.
Assuming that the interval from sending the text message to collision was 22 seconds, I would agree with the scenario that the engineer missed the signal due to texting.
The distraction may have continued past the signal. The fact that he never dumped the air suggests that he may not have even seen the opposing train prior to impact.
This engineer will go down in the RR hall of infamy, along with Ricky Gates of Conrail - Chase MD crash infamy.
My apologies if I’m being a little macabre, but perhaps if there is an EMS person here, I’m wondering what the red spray painted letter mean on the MetroLink locomotive above the deceased engineer? I’m assuming it marks the location of a victim, perhaps date and time documenting that the person was determined deceased or the like. Seems to say LFD w/ perhaps the date and time 9/12 1700.
Yeah - it does read like kind of a “Yeah Us” report - look how involved we were. So what did the tax payers get for their money.
Seems that human beings are pretty stupid overall. There has to be something very bad that happens before we’re willing to face certain facts - that some things are dangerous and should be restricted - ie talking on the phone while driving - texting while running a locomotive.
This engineer will go down in the RR hall of infamy, along with Ricky Gates of Conrail - Chase MD crash infamy.
Before making this kind of statement you might want to go look at the new thread I started today (Oct 4). 3 witnesses, 2 mature railfans and a 20 year old security guard, say the signal at the north switch was green, not red, when Sanchez left the Chatsworth station. Since the railfans were expecting the UP freight to appear before Train 111 got to the switch, they were surprised that the signal was green and spoke to each other about it. I think the thread is titled “New info on the LA Metrolink crash”.
Jack
the text message to collision was 22 seconds, I would agree with the scenario that the engineer missed the signal due to texting. Don’t get me started about drivers distracted by cell phones and - even worse - texting. Funny thing is that it is probably a lot less distracting to send and receive Morse code while driving than texting.
Great point. It is very easy to send morse code while mobile, especially with an iambic (touch paddles) type of keyer. You don’t have to stare at a keypad or menu letters. Just send by touch.