Not all freight lines need PTC. Only those that handle passenger trains and certain levels and/or types of hazmat. Maybe they will tell Amtrak and those hazmat shippers, “Sorry, can’t service you because we don’t have PTC operational.”
I would guess that even if congress doesn’t issue an extension, the FRA/USDOT will figure out a way to interpret the law to allow for individual waivers to be granted for those lines not equipped. Possibly only allowing the targeted trains (passenger and those with certain hazmat) to move only under absolute block rules on unequipped routes.
Since there are no industry standards for PTC and no sign that the Anti-Trust folks in the DOJ have given their blessing to any effort to develop them, even if some or all of the affected RRs do implement their in-house PTC, what will have been gained? AMTRAK is a horrible example. They have developed a system for the NE Corridor, but will that system work for AMTRAK trains operating on other RRs? While there are Members of Commerce who would be very happy to see all of AMTRAK shut down except for the NE Corridot there are many others who would not be happy. IMHO, when Congress realizes what the unforseen cosquences of the Law will do to the economy. they will hold hearings and then grant an extension.
When electric suburban trains began to run over the San Francisco – Oakland Bay Bridge in January 1939, an “automatic cab signal” system was installed. The following paragraph is from the railroad enthusiast newsletter The Western Railroader booklet “IER ‘The Big Red Cars:’”
[On the bridge passenger trains] “Were under automatic cab signals. When operating in this train control territory the engineer received a permissive speed indication of 11, 17, 25, or 35 miles per hour, depending on the traffic ahead. When the train speed equaled the cab signal indication a white light appeared. If the train exceeded by 1-1/2 miles [MPH] or more the permitted speed, a speed warning whistle sounded; and if the engineer did not shut off the power and apply the brakes within 2-1/2 seconds the power would be shut off automatically and the brakes applied in emergency. On leaving train control territory an “NS” indication appeared on the indicator showing
The problem is the law is written so that the lines requiring PTC are already set in stone regardless of the lack of any future hazmat or Amtrak traffic. The RRs would be non-compliant even if they didnt’ turn a single wheel.
Get real please. There are industry standards. A committee was established within days after the law was passed in 08 to insure interoperability of the systems. That’s why the industry has jointly decided to use the 220MH spectrum for the radio, that’s why the industry formed PTC220 LLC to acquire the spectrum, that’s why the industry purchased the Radio manufacturer. Unfortunately 3 systems have evolved, the Michigan (GE) system that was already in place that has now spread to Illinois, the Alstom system based on the 9 aspect cab signal system on the NEC that was already in place but required some enhancements to meet the full PTC functionality and the WABTEC used everywhere else.
The DOJ has nothing to do with it. The interchange standards only apply to rolling stock in free interchange (a railroad is free to do what ever it wants on equipment that stays on its property) since locomotives are interchanged (run throughs) the PTC equipment on board is of interest. Did the DOJ approve the 27 Pin MU connector, of Westinghouse air brakes or the right hand coupler?
The problem with the GE system is that it’s distributed and not office centric. This makes it almost impossible to deliver those often claimed business benefits of PTC. The current rollout of the WABTEC system doesn’t but can eventually be upgraded to do so, the GE system is where it’s at, really no upgrade path.
Actually I don’t think the law was written that way but the FRA rule making was. It froze in time traffic patterns of 2008 even though there were new hazmat routing requirements going in place in 2010. As I recall the AAR filed suit on this one and won.
You are probably correct. I was just thinking about the law passed by Congress setting up the monthly hourly (total and limbo times) cap, 48 or 72 hours off after so many continuous days of work, requiring 10 hours undisturbed rest, etc. The way I read the law, any time you did anything at the requirement of the railroad (running a train, deadheading, rules classes, etc.) it counted towards those caps. The way the FRA interpreted and implemented the law was different. Some things count fully towards all, some things partially.
Either the copy of the law posted on our bulletin board was wrong, or the FRA got creative in their interpretations. If it was the latter, that “stone” may&nbs
From what I’ve read, either in Trains or Railway Age-maybe both, PTC (in it’s current form) would not have prevented a couple of the low speed collisions that have happened. (Neither would ATC for that matter.) The trains were moving within the parameters of restricted speed and PTC would have allowed them to pass the last signal before the collision.
And the FRA will also allow, short distance, low speed transfer runs to operate without PTC in covered territory without being equipped. This seems to be a huge mistake to me…
…and a big mistake for the RRs to want it. It’s not terrible if you are doing a PTC overlay and keeping the existing signals for determining train location and movement authority. But if you ever want to wean yourself off fixed signalling onto “real” PTC, it’s just one more hurdle to get over with the FRA.
It’s bad enough to have installed all this new fixed signalling you’re only going to ask to pull up in a decade or two. If you make it a part of your safety plan you had to get approved, you have to jump through all those hoops again.
Either on specific locomotives and/or on wayside appurtences. These failures will happen every day in various locations with various pieces of equipment. The trains and locations involved will not be brought to a complete stop and will not stay stopped until the malfunctions are repaired.
With the Operating Rules for PTC operations having yet to be formulated it is unkonwn how badly the railroad will be affected by routine PTC failures; if the rules are written wrong it could be catastrophic.
In the harsh railroad enviornment - THINGS BREAK! It isn’t if, but when.
I would guess that a PTC failure would be treated similar to the way current cab signal/ATC failures are handled. A failure to pass the departure test at the initial station and the engine can’t lead. An enroute failure and the train can continue, either on signal indications (assuming they left them in) and/or absolute block.
The thing is, if they have gone to one man crews than the argument that the PTC system was the “second set of eyes” in the cab go out the window. Reading a discussion about the voted-down contract on the BNSF that would’ve allowed engineer only on PTC equipped trains pointed out that if the PTC failed, they didn’t have to call a conductor for the train to continue. If the PTC failed 10 miles into a 200+ mile run, the engineer would’ve been on his own for the remainder of the trip. (Except for the Master Conductor supervising him and who knows how many other trains via drone and/or inward facing camera.)
Considering the current political enviornment, I doubt the rules governing PTC failure will be as simple and straight forward as they are concerning the failure of current Train Control.
+1 I’d guess it will follow the rules that allow unequipped transfer jobs. Maybe restricting speed plus all sorts of manual “belt and suspenders” OS reporting in dark territory.
Might be even worse. Cab signal failure enroute knocks you to down to 40 mph (by rule, I think, on NS, maybe not be reg.) I’ll bet PTC failure will be more restrictive. The irony is that one slow train among many faster ones creates many more chances for collisions.
Our rules say 40 mph with wayside signal indications without an absolute block. Once an absolute block is given, may run up to 79 mph with wayside signal indications.
If there are no wayside signals, without the absolute block restricted speed. With the absolute block 49 mph.
When operating with an absolute block you can’t pass a signal displaying restricting, restricted-proceed, stop and proceed or stop without the dispatcher’s permission.
I think a PTC failure will be treated along the same lines. While politicians may have forced the implementation of PTC, I doubt they really know much about it, other than it’s promised to prevent accidents and crashes. Where it’s required or the exceptions within PTC territory to allow unequipped trains and engines. I would even bet they haven’t thought what to do when it fails because they don’t believe it can fail.
I agree that politicians will mandate things like PTC or ECP without understanding the drawbacks. But the real push comes from the industries that produce the equipment. They too realize that the decision makers have no technical knowledge, and the industry lobbyists are sure to take advantage of that, considering the enormous business that will come to them through a mandate. Large mandates that sweep through the gigantic, standardized infrastructure of the railroad industry are likely to become a work in progress that never ends.
To the question posed by the thread title, I would say, of course there will be an extension. There has to be. There will also be more features added to the mandate as time allows the state of the art to expand. The industry is a cash cow now, and safety mandates are in season politically.