Their awkward KC connection notwithstanding, the CGW couldn’t have remained competitive using their original Chicago route. As has been discussed, the Winston Tunnel was a maintenance nightmare and they had expensive IC trackage rights to cross the Mississippi. But also, the CGW had a horrible grade climb westward out of Dubuque. To remain competitive, they would have had to lose that whole Dubuque gauntlet. There were ideas to bypass Dubuque via Farley-Elizabeth with a new Mississippi high bridge, but that was nothing more than a prohibitively expensive idea. Even if they had built a Dubuque bypass (without the whole project sinking the company,) I can’t envision even that being advantageous enough.
I still think it’s a shame that more of the former CGW didn’t survive after being gobbled up by CNW. Back in the late 70’s the story I heard is that ICG offered CNW $1 for the segment from Dyersville out to Floyd’s Feed Store (just south of Petersburg). They were still getting serviced by CNW as late as 1979. I often wonder if Jack Haley had come along and purchased ICG’s Iowa Division, say, back in 1978 or 1979 he might have taken some of the CGW as well; particularly the line from Waterloo down to Kansas City.
It just wasnt a very good railroad.
I have Chicago Great Western In Color by Lloyd E. Stagner and will review it again this week plus take a look at their financials in the Moodys…but they didnt do anything that Burlington didnt do…and it took them 2x to get there.
Let’s see:
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Lousy Chicago terminal with very little originating traffic ability.
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Tunnel in western Il that was a nightmare (Winston Tunnel).
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Dubuque crossing of the Mississippi that was tough, including trackage rights.
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Slow routes to Mpls, Omaha, and KC
The management squeezed as much as they could by running one big train per day over each route (correct me if I am wrong).
One must ask the question…what did CNW see in CGW to purchase it?
Was it simply a buy out to get rid of a competitor?
Ed
As one who has studied this situation for several years, and reading all the comments about it in various forums etc, the biggest reason the CGW went under is the smae reason the Penn Central went under and several other roads. Over regulation by the government. Yes bad management decisions and union stubborns added to it, but when any business is prevented from being able to cover their costs by the government bankruptcy is almost certain especially for the more marginal ones.
The Chicago to Oelwein line seen two large trains a day in each direction just before the merger plus I think a local or two on the east end towards Chicago. There was also an occasional meat extra. I don’t know about the other lines; I’m guessing a similar train frequency.
From what I’ve gathered, the CNW only wanted the Marshalltown to KC portion of the CGW to access KC and also to rid itself from competition. Of course purchasing the RI spine line eliminated the need for the CGW trackage.
Jeff
CGW followed the Deramus operating philosophy of minimum trains/maximum tonnage, leading to a situation of one or two heavy trains daily on each line. This operating practice continued on KCS into the late 70’s/early 80’s and may have been the practice on MKT prior to John W. Barriger.
I’ve often wondered the same about the Virginian Railway (VGN). It was the most efficient coal hauler in the country during its time. It had the smallest grades from Norfolk to Kenova WV than any other such tidewater hauler.Again, for whatever reason, the VGN merged with the Norfolk & Western in 1959 and to this day there is not a single heritage locomotive for the VGN in Norfolk Southern’s stable or anything from which to remember the VGN; N&W even stopped used the low grade routes (over 80%).
Naturally, I also wonder: Was a merger really necessary? And could the VGN have survived without merging?
My grandfather was an engineer for 30+ years on the VGN and there are so many knowledgeable railroaders on this site, I would love to hear from some of you.
RE: Virginian Railway
I just did a bit of reading on-line, and the VGN sounds like it was a very profitable operation, and highly sought after by the C&O and the N&W. You ought to start a brand new thread on it. I’d love to learn more about it!
Well, I’ve learned so far that the CGW was doing good business to the end. If I understand correctly (from reading the 2008 thread linked above), it ran four, very long scheduled freights daily across Illinois, plus extra “meat” trains from Omaha up until the end of operations. The railroad was making money, and it had a very good debt-to-equity ratio of 20% (which, by the way, was much better than the C&NW’s of 52%). That all sounds pretty good to me. And that’s why I can’t just accept everyone’s assumption that it was a “weak railroad” that needed to merge to survive. Until I read something rigorous, my mind is open.
To Rails West:
I also studied the CGW route map in the Rand McNally Railroad Atlas and thought it looked pretty good; and like another writer, computed mileages on both the CNW (ex-CMO) and CGW lines between the Twin Cities and Omaha (I wondered why the CNW didn’t route more trains that way with the mileage advantage (although it wasn’t that much shorter)).
This was in the early 1970s after the CNW-CGW merger and I was regretting the loss of an interesting, but largely unknown to me, railroad that operated in the Twin Cities. I used to see CGW Baldwin switchers in action near my high school and I thought the red-and-scheme was pretty sharp (I still do!).
My real education about the CGW began after I started work in 1978 at CNW’s Twin Cities Division Engineering Department in St. Paul. We had charge of the ex-CGW line from South St. Paul south to Randolph, plus what remained of branch lines to Mankato and Red Wing (both laid with 75 lb. rail).
Of course, we had maps, grade profiles, records, etc. for that area, plus we had a collection of track charts (called condensed profiles by some railroads) for other CNW divisons that covered most of the remainder (except east of Dubuque which had been abandoned already).
After study, it became painfully obvious what a poor grade profile the CGW actually had; it was had to find any CGW line with a profile that DIDN’T resemble a coarse-toothed saw blade. One ex-CGW mechanical department employee who had worked at Hayfield, Minn. said that the CGW had a Car Dept. repair truck accompanying those long, “money-making” trains to repair the numerous broken knuckles and pulled drawbars encountered enroute.
The grades on both sides of Dubuque and the infamous Winston Tunnel have been mentioned by others; the tunnel was a major headache with unstable rock and constant groundwater infiltration.
As bad as the Chicago line was, the Kansas City line was even worse: so
Ah… all this discussion make me think I was born a hundred years too late - it would have been nice to go for a ride on the CGW!
Kurt:
What a great first hand look at this railroad. Cannot wait to read “the rest of the story.”
I stand corrected of the statement “one train each way.”. Thanks for the correction. Also, the book Chicago Great Western in Color, while mainly a photographic book, has extended captions which give info of operations.
Never had the pleasure to see the CGW, nor am I a fan (but am quickly becoming one thanks to this thread). During the past 20 years, I have travelled quite a bit from Chicago to Dubuque and there are a few remnants left of the railroad, particularly at Stockton where the depot remains as a museum. I have not had the time to seek out the tunnel.
My library contains two Moody’s Transportation Manuals which reference CGW - 1955 and 1971. The latter edition contains limited info, as it was already merged into CNW. Certain info is available tho.
The CGW entered the 1950’s with revenue of $33.1m and net income of $2.8 m with an operating ratio of 70.4%. By 1955 the numbers were $34.4, $3.2, and 66.6 (which was pretty much the high water mark for the railroad). By 1960 revenue was $32.5 with net income of $1.5m and the operating ratio had slipped to 73.5.
I do not have tonnage figures for 1960, but there was a dramatic drop from 1950 to 1954. Tons hauled dropped from 8.6 million to 7.6 million. The times, they were a changin. The big drop in tonnage was with coal. While CGW had no on line coal mines that I am aware of, considerable coal was received from other carriers. Nearly half of the 1 million drop in tonnage was due to coal tonnage reductions. This was due to industries converting from coal to natural gas during the period.
Fresh meats, while not a huge business for CGW was a highly rated commodity(4.8% of carloadings and 6% of revenue in 1954). Carloadings were beginning to drop during this period. Flour production was shifting away from Mi
I’m not absolutely sure, but I believe that the CGW Chicago terminal was located near Cicero Ave on the B&OCT.
I will continue the financial analysis of Chicago Great Western during the 1960’s. Not nearly as much info is available as my 1971 Moody’s has limited info, as CGW was folded into the CNW at that time.
The beginning of the decade found the CGW in reasonably good shape. Revenue was $32.5 m with net income of $1.5 m and operating ratio of 70.4. A steady erosion of revenue was underway.
By 1967 revenue had fallen to $28.6 m with net income of $1m and the operating ratio had spiked to 80.8%. Ton miles were basically the same in 1967 - 2.473 billion ton miles in 1960 to 2.452 in 1967. The railroad was handling about as much freight as in 1960, but the revenue and net profit were falling.
Not surprisingly, revenue per ton mile (measure in cents) fell dramatically during the 60’s from 1.21 to 1.12. While that might not sound “dramatic”, think about the inflationary pressures and then realize this reduction was “nominal $” without the effect of inflation.
So, during the 1960’s, CGW was handling as much freight, but for less $$$.
CGW was able to squeeze a net income by reduction in costs. We have discussed the long train concept. Now, consider that during the entire 1960-1967 period CGW installed 30 miles of new 115 pound rail. Not 30 miles per year, but 30 miles TOTAL. That is less than 4 miles per year, with most years near the end being 2 miles.
Rock Island averaged 20 miles per year replacement. Granted RI had 7000 miles of track vs 1400 for the CGW, but the Rock basically shut down capex in anticipation of the Great Union Pacific rescue.
So, could CGW have survived until today?
It was on a financial glidepath that was not indicative of survival. The trucks were making inroads to the small communities of Iowa. Meat was leaving the rails as the industry was changing. Coal was disappearing. Unit grain trains were
Paul:
It had to have been somewhere near Cicero. There are a number of photos taken from Central and Austin Avenues. These photos show are taken from the south side of the tracks and show the Eisenhower Expressway.
It had to have been further east.
ed
Paul:
Several clues to yard location:
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CORA map currently shows a 48th Ave yard on BOCT. Google map shows several tracks on south side of the mainline and a couple north of the tracks adjacent to Alpha Baking.
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1958 Official Guide BRC map shows a yard just west of the BRC junction, correspondign to the CORA location today.
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B&OCT listing in 1958 OG shows interchange with CGW at two locations “South Cicero Ave, Chicago and Robey Street, Chicago”.
Gotta be west of Cicero, either north or south of mainline.
ed
Ed,
The yard the CGW leased from the B&OCT was called the “Chicago Transfer Yard” and it lays just south of the Eisenhower Expressway between Cicero and Laramie Avenues in Chicago. The yard is lightly used today by the CSXT to serve a couple local industries. CGW freights normally operated directly into the B&OCT yard and the power layed over there, while the small amount of local traffic CGW handled was set out and switched at “the Transfer”.
A few excerpts from the contribution by Kurt (sandiego) above:
Kurt,
I really appreciate this perspective from the engineering department. It was very interesting to read about the Kansas City line during the surge in Russian grain traffic.
I look forward to any other commentary you might have about the CGW lines.
Responding to posts by Ed (MP173):
Ed,
Thanks a lot for that financial summary. I put your numbers into charts, and used moving average lines to bridge between data points. It would be interesting to compare these numbers with other railroads. Probably there were a number of railroads in those years showing similar trends.
Chart 1. Revenue (upper line), and Net Income (or profit) (lower line)
Chart 2. Operating Ratio (Operating expenses as a percentage of revenue)
Would anybody like to comment on these financial results, and what they tell us about the company? It is in
Railswest:
Tell you what…give me a few railroads and I will give you data. Seems you have the charting down.
If you have never seen a Moody’s Transportation Manual, and you are interested in the financial data of railroads on an historical basis, you should go to a good library and spend an hour. Our public library does not have them, but the local university does. I have purchased 1955, 1970, 1971 (thrown in as a special value on the 1955 purchase) plus 1980 and 1988.
Great stuff if you are into railroad history, from an asset and liability basis.
Ed
Just a little more info about CGW…
The 1953 OG lists their passenger trains schedules. One could actually take a passenger train from Kansas City to Chicago - 596 miles. Leaving KC at 3pm, one would arrive in Chicago at 11am the following morning. No sleeper service, coach only with a change of trains at Oelwein (arr 150am, departure at 230am).
596 miles in 20 hours.
For comparison, the Santa Fe’s “Chicagoan” left at 1230pm and arrived in Chicago at 8pm.
451 miles in 7.5 hours.
Any questions as to why CGW didnt stick around?
The Chicago - Minneapolis schedule wasnt quite as bad…leave at 430pm with arrival the next morning at 830am.
The Burlington’s Afternoon Zephyr left at 4pm with arrival in Minneapolis at 1045pm.
ed