N&W retired these locomotives during 1958, 1959 and 1960, and it looks like they replaced them with the RS-11 and GP9. I am wondering how long they should have been used, from a purely economic stand? Would it have made sense to use the A and Y5 until 1966, when the SD40 came out, and the Y6 until the SD40-2 was available in 1972?
Theoretically they should have had anywhere from a thirty to forty year lifespan given proper maintanance, which the N&W was renowned for anyway.
A lot of N&W fans (And probably more than a few N&W officials) think and thought they could have been used very sucessfully right through the 1960s, but honestly the environmental laws coming on the books in the 70’s would have killed them.
Steam engines are exempt from air pollution laws, but only because there’s so few of them around now.
N&W did benefit from waiting so long (compared to the others) to dieselize, by doing so they avoided all the mistakes the other railroads made. When they finally bought road diesels they bought Geeps and didn’t bother with anything else.
This is an interesting question, because it has nothing to do with the actual economic lifespan of the latter classes of N&W steam power, only with the perceived diesel alternatives. The practical lifespan of a locomotive like a Y6 or A was virtually unlimited, really determined by the practical costs of maintaining a place like Shaffer’s Crossing in operating condition, and by emergent ‘crystallization’ in the cast engine beds. Everything else … with key exceptions … was like the old joke about the hatchet Washington cut the cherry tree down with – ‘here it is! of course, it’s had three new heads and seven broken handles since then, but it’s the same hatchet’. Or the modern equivalent that is a ‘restored’ historical classic car…
The problem was that a range of specialty equipment, too expensive to ‘make’ or protected by dog-in-the-manger patents, became unobtainable in the Fifties, and railroads heavily dependent on this found it impossible to justify keeping the whole top-heavy structure of steam power going. To a certain extent this became self-fulfilling; as the remaining steam railroads progressively threw in the towel, each successive step became more obvious. But I have little doubt that even a motivated N&W would have kept on with steam any longer than, say, NKP did … and note what a logical fit a steam NKP and a steam N&W would have represented at historical merger time!
If we assume that the powers-that-be (some of whom would famously go on to wreck Penn Central) had not buffaloed N&W into quick abolition of steam, the logical power would not have been four-motor anything. For example there were 2400hp six-motor units in being at that point, even one early enough to have a 244 engine. As I recall, in fact a set of six-motor Alcos were indeed tested early on N&W, and they were adopters of Century-series (C630, but not C636, which may be due to the Hi-Ad truck issues) by th
Overmod wrote (among many more things)
“The practical lifespan of a locomotive like a Y6 or A was virtually unlimited”
Another one innocent of the Wöhler graph of aging of steel, see if you like: https://www.ing-hanke.de/know-how/woehlerkurve/
No technical machine has a ‘virtually unlimited’ lifespan because of - see above. If nothing else … Mind, the people restoring classic cars, airplanes or locomotives are fighting just the decay caused by aging (and rust of course).
The lifespan of technical things is mostly defined by their ‘economic’ life. That is, not to speak of the precipitous throw away of steam for dieselization, a lifespan during which maintenance stays decently low, functionality is secure and the machine does not become too obsolete or consumption becomes too high. Regarding all that, economic lifespan of steam locomotives was mostly considered to be between 30 and 40 years. If the engines were hard pressed in service which the N&W steam engines surely were, economic lifespan would likely be
Keep in mind when I say ‘virtually’ that does not mean ‘unconditionally’. The actual metallurgical issues regarding ‘aging’ of cast-steel frames – the thing referred to as ‘crystallization’ when I was first exposed to it in the early '70s, back in the dark ages before creep mechanisms were really understood – are interesting.
I see no reasons why the methods used to remediate the problems in the cast-steel GG1 underframes to suit them for higher-speed service would not work for GSC-style engine beds. You would need more careful control of your jigs and supports, and probably even longer soak times and careful thermal management.
The alternative of fabricating a proper modern frame using lost-foam castings combined with properly cut and hydroformed material is of course also an option for ‘extending the practical life’ of a large engine should, for any reason, its cast bed become damaged beyond practical remediation. Whether this is cost-effective considering the locomotive purely as an economic asset in railroading, as in some schemes of ‘plandampf’, is of course an issue unrelated to whether it can be done technically.
Understanding the failures of the steam-turbine-electrics in the late '40s and ‘50s takes a little careful scrutiny to ‘unwind’. The surviving material at the Hagley paints an almost comical picture regarding Baldwin’s development of what became the C&O M-1 turbines; the PRR people were convinced a significant part of the secrecy and ‘accelerated development’ was to get around a couple of Carleton Steins’ patents – it shows in the detail design. One thing I heard was that the coal dust ‘electrical’ problem also involved inevitable moisture getting into the traction-motor cooling path. This would cause conductive carbon fines to accumulate in the motor casings, much like brush dust in EMDs; when the locomotive goes across some
I’m not a technical expert, and while Juni is, you have managed to turn her off with your scrutinizing elaborated detailed snip-snap taking apart of her postings into small, tiny and tiniest particles so that all lose their context in that process and look only at special cases which blurrs the general picture.
Like I see that you seem to know all and everything about what this historical steam turbine electric loco did or didn’t and why and what failed in which way. From that you let on that it must be quite impossible to put all those shortcomings right and therefore it would be impossible to build a new such engine that really works. Since all that is only extrapolated from the old loco including all its errors you ignore and you make disappear from view any technological progress, the things Juni takes into account.
That is why she comes to the conclusion it would be possible and that’s what she meant writing about a successful loco and you come to the contrasting conclusion it would not be possible.
Now I must write: you should stop this, you don’t come to where ends meet. And I have a certain decided feeling you don’t want to, yours is not a technical discussion, you just want to take her posting apart. You can’t let her posting stand unimpaired.
I don’t like that, stop fooling with my friend!
Sara
I said nearly the exact opposite with regard to the possibility of modern steam power; I have been involved in working on designs for it for many years and continue to be actively involved in it. All I’m discussing are some of the economic preconditions about what would be practical for freight locomotive adoption in a presently diesel-centric world, which should not be taken either as denigration or any attempt at one-upsmanship: if Juni were to disagree, the discussion is about steam power, not anyone’s particular view (or prejudice, as in certain other threads) regarding it.
As it happens that I have worked very specifically on remediation of cast-steel GSC frames, and on design of modern alternatives to cast engine beds for large reciprocating locomotives, I feel qualified to comment on whether locomotives need to be considered “worn out” at some point merely due to metal fatigue considerations in cast-steel engine beds (or frames). That is as far as that particular discussion of posting needs to go; if there are technical reasons why what I said was wrong (and I would greatly enjoy hearing a level technical discussion of why that might be the case) it is simple just to state them on a non-ad-hominem basis.
Overmod,
Ok, now I have written you a personal message about it.
It has two sides, mind them both. Thank you and looking
for the best
0S5A0R0A3
I have not read it yet, but you may be assured that I will.
The economic lifespan cannot be determined solely by the locomotive itself and what it’s made of. If all other classes of N&W steam had been retired, it would have been idiotic to keep steam servicing and repair facilities (and people) around in addition to the ones for the diesels. Crews would’ve had to be trained on both types. That may work well during a relatively short changeover period but would be problematic over a many year span.
This is not an unrecognized issue, but my answer will have to wait until i get to a device on which the page doesn’t keep spontaneously blanking.
This was obviously a concern for the ACE project, which involved a very wide range of technologies not found in any shop operations present in the '80s for railroads that would be buying and running fleets of ACE3000s or equivalent. There was of course zero point zero possibility of eliminating diesel shop servicing on those railroads.
The original GE locomotives built for the Milwaukee were starting to be retired just shy of the 50 year mark, and very few were left at the end of electric operation some 58 years after initial operation. Common reason for retirement was a broken frame.
The PCC streetcars on Ashmont - Mattapan. Boston, were built 1945. The equipment of Manx Electric, Isle of Man, is the original from its opening, before 1900. The DD1s from Penn Station’s opening in 1910, hauled LIRR freight through WWII and passengers Jamaica - Penn Station to 1949, then two worked for the Station sand tunnels wire train until after ther PC merger 1971.
Erik, the frames on the EF1 and EP1 are characteristic of older design with relatively thin and sometimes even fabricated construction. They are not representative of the one-piece-casting characteristic of what became GSC practice (“the only things we can’t cast here are an engineer and fireman”)
A better example would be the cracking, and presumptive causes, in the GG1 frames around the time of proposed rebuilding for higher speed in the mid-'70s. That in turn is a different thing from the accelerated freakshow that was PRR P5a frame cracking through the '60s (culminating in the always-amusing reason those locomotives tended to have such shiny recently-repainted frames so much of the time… [:O])
Dale,
I believe the answer is that N&W retired its steam engines when it made economic sense to do so.
I have no doubt that they ran an extensive Net Present Value analysis of future costs and benefits before deciding.
The issue was not just how much would it cost to maintain the engines, but also coal and water facilities, and a small army of maintenance and water service people for steam compared with loan payments on new diesels, the cost of new maintenance facilities, net scrap value of scraping steam and removing steam facilities, and huge reduction in cost of labor to maintain the power with diesels.
That N&W dieselized late means that they could be assured that they were accurate in their analysis.
The point is not that steam could have been physically maintained at ever increasing cost, but that diesels would do the job going forward for less cost. If steam was ‘only half worn out’, in the physical sense, the implication of your question, it is irrelevant. That is a sunk cost issue which is irrelevant in capital budgeting decisions. The question is about minimizing costs going forward.
Mac McCulloch
I’m tempted to believe that the timing of N&W’s steam locomotive retirement was tied to the N&W and VGN merging. The VGN had a very modern electrification which was also the victim of the merger. Steam was unique to the N&W, electric unique to the VGN but diesels were common to both.
Apart from any merger considerations, just by the fact that continuing the given steam locomotives until the improved diesels had appeared would obviously have saved the N&W to buy or rent a whole generation of diesels: the first ones that by objective measurement have not been the best (or else, why would they have been replaces so soon?) Since a diesel loco cost several times more than a steam loco and you needed more than one diesel to replace one big steam loco (quite the oposite of what diesel builders advertised!) to save expenses on one generation of these by using the locos that were there would clearly have avoided substantial costs for N&W.
Of course, the diesel fans here will not agree because to them a steam locomotive devours all the resorces of a railway (wonder how they had come through until the diesels were available? rightly they should all have gone bankrupt from the mantenance and millions of workers costs of steam?) while a diesel loco demands close to nothing, yes, a trifle bit of fuel, less than a truck probably and all in all so little a driver could have brought it in a quarter bottle for a weeks shift. What a wonderful machine such a two cycle diesel loco was, sorry, is! (you sense: to me it’s a machine of yesteryears, without any future and just about to make US railroads stay behind modern, efficient today’s traction more and more)
I know, I know, I know …
Sara
The difference is that when all the railroads had steam locomotives, their costs were similar. Once some converted to diesels, their costs were much lower than the ones that still operated large fleets of steamers. Look at my username. How many backshops and roundhouses are still in use? Very few. Look at CSX and NS. They have combined their backshops into Huntington and Altoona, respectively, IIRC. The railroads that they include had major shops in Reading, Collinwood, Sayre, Hornell, Waycross, Jacksonville, Louisville, Columbus, Albany, Springfield, Beechgrove and many others.
For what it might be worth, the decision to ‘dieselize’ the N&W rapidly was made by lawyers who had come to be in charge of the railroad, and was made on criteria significant to lawyers having little to do with how effectively the locomotives worked. Their criteria were not ‘our’ criteria, but the ones with their fingers on the gold made the rules.
I do not know whether the VGN merger had an impact on the decision. There were specific deadhead requirements on electric equipment utilization that were the stated reasons for abolishing the electrification, which would not have applied equally to steam. While not directly comparable, N&W’s own Elkhorn Grade electrification was summarily abandoned in favor of steam, instead of being rebuilt with more modern equipment, when the new tunnel and grade improvements were made there in 1950.
It might have been interesting to see if Brown’s paper in the early '60s would have affected their perceptions, but I suspect it would not.
I kind of wonder about that, too, especially with claims from various sources including the Brown studies of lower maintenance costs for steam over diesel.
Starting a diesel locomotive is a little more complicated than hopping into the driver’s seat of a car and turning a key (I don’t own a recent-generation car, do you now wave a “key fob” and press a button?). But yes, bringing up a steam locomotive from a cold condition is much more complicated and lengthy than cranking a diesel, and this ap