Still happens, they just send Engineering out to install a portable derail. That’s the “additional physical method of securement”, and as air brakes are not the other method the two hour inspection bit does not apply. Many sidings have also had “special” derails installed, sounds exciting but they are just a regular derail which the rules allow to be left in the non-derailing position when there is no equipment for it to protect.
Gotta be a lawyer to understand these rules.
This is getting too Talmudic for me. I interpreted the MM&A rule to say, in essence, no air (independent or automatic) could be applied during the last of what may be several pull tests, the one that finally confirms enough handbrakes are set to ‘secure’ the train. The relevance is that Harding apparently violated that rule, and apparently had done so almost systematically and so, by report, had other engineers. It ‘should’ not really matter if you apply independent, automatic, or both AFTER the train is confirmed secure… as long as you used no air when finalizing that confirmation.
Note all the careful notes on what happens now if you choose to apply the automatic on a train secured on the main line… pay careful attention to that two-hour rule, which I think is far less there for ‘safety’ than for making it so financially and operationally unpalatable for a railroad to apply the brakes in that way as to functionally eliminate it; compare the intent (and success!) of the Red Flag ‘safety’ law with road steam in Britain.
We need a ‘rail Shem Tov’ for the Talmudic aspects of what rules apply when rules aren’t followed, or what rules apply when rules are interpreted outside their stated scope using some inchoate principle of exegesis or other. I am not that person.
Exactly.
Also note that the two-hour rule does not apply to trains left on the main track with handbrakes properly applied and both the automatic & independent brakes applied.
In reality, the two-hour rule is there to allow switching operations where the crew leaves the train unattended on the mainline and proceeds away from it, into a yard or up a spur. Before Lac-Megantic we did not have to apply handbrakes at all in that situation, just leave the train vented or in emergency (two-hour limit still applied).
Someone at work made up a handy flowchart to explain the new Rule 112, but now I can’t find a copy online. It really is much simpler than it looks, or maybe I’ve just gotten used to it over time.
[quote user=“SD70M-2Dude”]
Overmod
The MM&A rule does not forbid automatic air only; it forbids any use of air.
The Canadian rule forbade the use of automatic ON a secured train, whether in addition to handbrake securement or not. MM&A did have the practice of leaving the automatic released so the single-man would not have to do the required brake test after 4 hours application, but (1) law would not allow it to be used to hold the train anyway … but note independent application wasn’t forbidden … and (2) it was assumed by rule that the train would be pull-tested without air to be secure.
I don’t know about the U.S. or other jurisdictions, but there is no such rule in Canada. On CN trains are routinely parked for far longer than that (sometimes for several days) with a full service application of the automatic brake, and all the new crew has to do is release it and start pulling, after the Conductor releases the handbrakes of course. No air test, the only requirement is for the tail end pressure to reach 75 PSI and the flow to drop below 60 CFM.
The only requirement for an air test en-route is if equipment has been left off air for more than 24 hours, then a No. 1A brake test is to be performed by the train crew. This consists of the Conductor walking the train and verifying that all the brake pistons apply and release properly.
And as I noted in an earlier post, before Lac-Megantic we would leave trains unattended with a full service application of the automatic, full application of the independent and only one handbrake on the lead locomotive. Legal at the time, not anymore.
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For the lazy, and the phone-afflicted who cannot search GCOR/NORAC effectively, what are the exact rules (and if possible carrier-specific safety ‘extensions’ that describe this practice? I presume this 20lb set is in addition to full manual securement confirmed by pull test?
I agree that it does not matter according to the confines of this MM&A rule which is shown in the TSB report:
Crew members are responsible for securing standing equipment with hand brakes to prevent undesired movement. The air brake system must not be depended upon to prevent an undesired movement.
However, it does matter according to MM&A rules IF MM&A has a rule that says you cannot apply the automatic brake after the train is confirmed secure by the by the push-pull test. I have not actually seen this rule, but it has been reported many times in the news, and the reason given for that rule is that MM&A wanted to save money by avoiding any delay in releasing the automatic brake. I would like to see that rule.
This is my point in bringing this up:
Harding violated the rule forbidding the use of air to produce intended securement when he left the independent brake applied during the push pull test, and applied insufficient handbrakes needed to pass that test.
He could have easily extended this faulty practice by als
You wouldn’t find it in the GCOR book, beyond general requirement. Securement procedure rules will be in Air Brake and Train Handling rule books. Supplemented by local directives.
Tie hand brakes as directed by system and/or local specific instructions. Release automatic and independent air brakes. Allow time for air brakes to release and slack to adjust. (We don’t do a push/pull type test.) Once satisfied that train is secure, apply automatic with a 20psi set and fully apply independent. Isolate locomotives in lead consist using isolatation switch on each unit, dp consists through dp remote screen. Open generator field switch, remove reverser. Close and lock windows and doors (when possible) on lead locomotive when outside of terminal areas. For KEY trains, if the door(s) can’t be locked take the reverser with you. Notify the dispatcher (or other authority) train is secured. For KEY trains there is a specific checklist that must be gone over with the dispatcher
In this link: https://www.desmogblog.com/2017/10/24/deadly-lac-megantic-oil-train-disaster-was-avoidable-corporate-crime
It is reported that the train that ran away at Lac Megantic was heavier than regulations allowed. It says that the train’s maximum allowed weight was 6,300 tonnes. The actual weight was 9,100 tonnes.
I have noticed that issue being commented on in other reports as well. What regulations are they talking about? Are they government regulations or MM&A rules? If they are government regulations, what is the penalty for violating them?
Don’t know what angle Daigle is trying to play beyond having operated the locomotive that caught fire a day or two previously and having made a ‘work report’ on the failings of that locomotive at the conclusion of that particular trip - as a engineer is required to do (at least in the US). It isn’t stated if the Work Report was turned in at a US or Canadian terminal (the name mentioned sounds French-Canadian).
I have no idea where the 6300 tons enters the picture. I am going to presume this was not the first oil train that had been handled on this route and I would expect the prior trains to have been in the 9100 ton area, if not heavier.
I will agree that MM&A Management - from the Trainmaster & Road Foreman of Engines to and including the President should be the ones on trial for the roads demonstrated lack of a safety culture. Their actions and inactions set the stage for Harding’s and the others failures to SECURE the train, despite what each individual may have thought when they performed their actions.
I find a lot of advocacy journalism in the Internet that is defending Harding and the others on trial, and blaming the accident on the upper management for a safety culture that was compromised for the sake of profit. I can see both sides and I have no idea how the court will rule.
There is a feeling that the prosecutors are under pressure to blame the disaster on someone because the public wants someone held accountable. And so it is assumed that the prosecutors are going after the little guy because that will be the easiest case to make. After all, it was Harding alone who broke the rule on securing the train.
But what the prosecutors may not have realized is that the public may see through this scheme of going after the easiest target; and like some advocates speaking out now, the public too may feel that the MM&A caused the disaster by corporate greed.
The public may sympathize with Harding and think he did the best he could as a one-man crew. Harding was apparently well known and well liked in Lac Megantic. So if he is made a scapegoat for what the public considers greedy management, there may be a public backlash.
Well Bucky, in this case I agree with you. It was a disaster waiting to happen. Bad locomotive repair, bad track, little support, and many more circumstances all coming together and blam! Death comes to town. And the regulators did little to prevent it. They had lax supervision. Now they look for the scapegoat.
I am reminded of the game of Jienga, where the players keep removing blocks and trys to not be the one who pulls the “key” block that causes the tower to fall. Harding was “it”. But all the other players also pulled out blocks.
Electroliner,
I’m in agreement with you. There was decidely fault far above the actions of Thomas Harding. If memory serves he died on the law before he had sufficient time to secure his train and was told to stop work and enter his rest period. Assuming I’m correct, that should transfer some of the liability up the chain of command. One is obligated to follow orders from above or suffer the consequences of not doing so. Think military where you must follow your last order first.
I am of the opinion a change of venue would be in order given my doubts Harding could get a fair trial given the jurors were likely selected from those affcted by the didaster. Far too much emotion involved locally for him to be fairly treated by the jury.
Were I in Harding’s position when ordered to stop work and go on rest I would have, on my own time, made certain the train was secure. Rules be damned. They can’t tell me what to do once I am off the clock.
The entire situation is sad and regretful. 47 people died and downtown Lac Megantic was reduced to rubble but not due to Harding
[quote user=“Norm48327”]
Electroliner 1935
Well Bucky, in this case I agree with you. It was a disaster waiting to happen. Bad locomotive repair, bad track, little support, and many more circumstances all coming together and blam! Death comes to town. And the regulators did little to prevent it. They had lax supervision. Now they look for the scapegoat.
I am reminded of the game of Jienga, where the players keep removing blocks and trys to not be the one who pulls the “key” block that causes the tower to fall. Harding was “it”. But all the other players also pulled out blocks.
Electroliner,
I’m in agreement with you. There was decidely fault far above the actions of Thomas Harding. If memory serves he died on the law before he had sufficient time to secure his train and was told to stop work and enter his rest period. Assuming I’m correct, that should transfer some of the liability up the chain of command. One is obligated to follow orders from above or suffer the consequences of not doing so. Think military where you must follow your last order first.
I am of the opinion a change of venue would be in order given my doubts Harding could get a fair trial given the jurors were likely selected from those affcted by the didaster. Far too much emotion involved locally for him to be fairly treated by the jury.
Were I in Harding’s position when ordered to stop work and go on rest I would have, on my own time, made certain the train was secure. Rules be damned. They can’t tell me what to do once I am off the clock.
The
Balt, I will back you up on the location of Bangor. Of course, there have been disputes over the border of Maine, but I have the impression that they were settled many years ago, leaving Bangor in Maine and Maine one of the early states of the Union.
Yes, Bangor is the jewel in Maine’s crown. But given the cold and the number of donut shops in town one could be excused for mistaking it for Canada.
As I said, I have no idea what this court will decide. Technically, it seems like a conviction of Harding is inevitable. People can say that if this or that had not also happened, the disaster would have been averted. But those items were not against the rules, and there was no way of foreseeing their possible contribution to the runaway.
It is flawed logic to say (as many have said) that every detail that could have prevented the accident contributed to the cause. I perceive that this thinking tends to be a smoke screen to diminish the responsibility for the actual cause. Harding was the last person whose action could have prevented the disaster, and he alone broke the rule requiring him to execute that action.
The only possible excuse for him that I can see is that he did not know what the rules required, and did not know that he did not know that. It seems to me that in order to blame Harding, he would have had to have been required to sign an agreement, as a condition of his employment, which spelled out his duty to abide by rule 112 and all special instructions that supplement that rule. If he did that, I expect the court to find him guilty of failing to secure the train.
If he did not do that, then is seems like he just made a mistake. Clearly he believed he had secured the train, and in practical terms, he had secured it. It is just that his securement subsequently failed because he had not done it according to rules that would have prevented that failure.
Harding, his employer, and others in MMA’s employ are all responsible. Sure, Harding was the point man in this disaster, and he likely could have prevented it; however, there wasn’t adaquate oversight, and for that the Company is to blame. They lobbied and received permission to run one crew trains on the premise that there would be safety measures in place that would compensate for not having a conductor present. Not only did Harding fail, the Company failed, and the regulatory system of checks and balances failed as well… a total fail all ’ round.
I can see that way of looking at, but I have no idea how the court will look at it. As I understand it, the charge is criminal. I am not sure if all those other players’ negligence rises to the test for criminal negligence. Personally, I don’t care which way it goes, and I cannot see a way to predict it.
In what way to you believe that MM&A was negligent for not having safety measures in place that would have compensated for not having a conductor present?
For starters, not allowing a train of 70 loaded oil cars to be left unattended in any event.
Do we know the specific charges upon which the defendents are being tried?