You are assuming that he 1. Knew how to properly secure a train and 2. knew that his “securement” was inadequate. Was he even competent to know those things? Ignorance is his best defense. If he can convince the jury that his employer trained him improperly then he probably walks. BUT since as I recall the end of his trip was in the U.S. he would have had to be FRA licenced and I presume hold a Canadian equivalent then he can only play a limited amount of dumb.
A two day later train was not securred properly ? Wonder what commodities ? That is a really daming fact to any jury.
If presented as such, it would demonstrate the Company’s lack of training of their crews on how to properly secure a train. Depending upon what actual charges are being tried in the trial it would be very damning.
Jesus H Christ, don’t you remember this being covered in the preliminary reports? He WAS concerned, he EXPLICITLY asked those two morons in the RFC if he should stay to watch the deflicted engine; they told him to get off the clock and stay off the clock, and then chose not to call him either for the ensuing fire or its pathetic fire-department aftermath. I think it was the fire department that asked the elderly French-Canadian trackwalker about the finer points of shutting down a burning locomotive, another step in the calamity – sure hope the lawyers don’t try to scapegoat that poor man.
Tom Harding has much to answer for, but something he does not need is misguided judgmental blaming/hating for something that was explicitly put out of his control by order of his superiors.
This is where a real safety culture comes into play. Now granted, I am familiar with what may be the ultimate safety culture, which is the nuclear generation field. Aviation and medicine would be close behind. In nuclear generation records of training, actual job performance , and qualifications are kept. If I was told to do something that was contrary to proper safety or quality procedures it would be easy to demonstrate that I knew the proper ( and sometimes legal) way to do my job. I would have NO excuse for following instructions that varied from established procedures. I am encouraged to question my instructions. If i am ordered to do something that is wrong and dangerous I can have an NRC inspector there 24 hours a day. To put this in perspective this incident killed 16 times as many people as have been killed by nuclear energy in the generation industry. 3 men killed on an experimental army reactor, SL-1 in 1961 is the total. When you put dollars before lives, you will have Lac Megantics.
In the full context from which you extracted the quote by me above, I said this:
It was reported that the engineer told his supervisor(s) about the problem, and at least implied that he advised his supervisor(s) that he wanted to shut down the engine before leaving it. It was reported that the supervisor(s) told him to leave the engine runnin
Now you have me going back and having to look over the testimony carefully again, because I don’t remember him being told explicitly that the single engine had caught fire and been shut down without another one being started. If you’ll do that too I think we can arrive at the direct references in the previous reporting more quickly.
It does raise the hair on the back of my neck to think that between the three of them they might have thought that it would be OK to leave that train with no running power or operating air compressors until 7am for the ‘next engineer’ to solve. I am not sure ‘totally dismissive’ is a fair term to use, though; if I remember correctly Harding was aware of the fact that he had left his train partly ‘hanging’ on the independent brake, and was concerned about ensuring an engine stayed ‘pumping’ when he thought the damaged lead engine’s prime mover might ‘quit without notice’. I would find it difficult to believe that had he been told just a few minutes later that the engine had not only quit but caught fire he would be more ignorant of the consequences; perhaps it is more likely that he was “reassured” that the situation would be taken care of without his on-the-clock attention (and I do remember what I think was some language from Farnham RTC to that effect – see if you can find the exact language in the transcripts).
The concern I have is that Harding will receive ‘hostile witness’ treatment and selective questioning when he is placed on the stand, and made to look ‘guilty’ following very much the same kind of logic and phrasing you used. The ‘blaming/hating’ was not directed at you specifically. Of course I can’t do anything
Here is a transcript of conversations between Harding and his supervisor(s) including audio:
Here is the part where the engineer is told that the locomotive he left running had caught fire and been shut down. He is also informed that the locomotive will not be re-started until morning. Neither person expresses any concern about the air leaking off and releasing the independent brakes. I have emphasized some of it in bold:
Third conversation
11:59 p.m.
RJ calling Harding at the Auberge hotel
RJ: Sorry to bother you.
TH: No problem.
[quote user=“Euclid”]
Here is a transcript of conversations between Harding and his supervisor(s) including audio:
Here is the part where the engineer is told that the locomotive he left running had caught fire and been shut down. He is also informed that the locomotive will not be re-started until morning. Neither person expresses any concern about the air leaking off and releasing the independent brakes. I have emphasized some of it in bold:
Third conversation
11:59 p.m.
RJ calling Harding at the Auberge hotel
RJ: Sorry to bother you.
TH: No problem.
Norm,
I have no agenda in this. I do not care who wins or loses in this trial. I am also unable to decide who is guilty of causing the Lac Megantic disaster. I have commented on this in ways that probe into the culpability of both management and labor. I think it is a very interesting case. What was explored in previous threads is now pertinent to this trial, and we are discussing the trial here.
He’s actually doing EXACTLY what I asked him to do: recover the transcript of conversation between TH and RJ regarding the critical detail of starting one of the units. I did misremember some of the detail, and I am thankful to him for providing the exact reference.
The ‘bone of contention’ here is a point that may or may not be specifically elicited here (and a ‘partial’ version may not bring up the specific point that Euclid and I would like to see clearly made in the trial testimony.
Some combination of rule making and expediency gave the people involved the idea that a train secured by locomotive plus seven ‘handbrakes’ (and on tank cars that’s half the securement of a car with full foundation rigging) plus independent, on a 2% grade, with a single known-defective engine running, was ‘secure’. The immediate question Euclid has is whether Harding or RJ recognized the problem with the EOT bleeding down the independent with all the prime movers off. It seems relatively clear that Harding was concerned enough to ask to go start another (and was overruled) BUT not enough to insist that an engine be started before ‘the American’ arrived at 7 to take the next leg. Which argues to me that he did not truly realize the immediacy of the danger…
and yes, this ought to be elicited as part of Harding’s trial testimony, as yes, it is (at least in my opinion) highly relevant to Harding’s share of responsibility for the accident.
Overmod,
Then I would suspect the fault to lie higher up the chain of command.
Unfortunately, both Up and Down the chain of command.
The ultimate responsibility rests with the Engineer that did not SECURE the train. His limited training may have led him to believe it was secured, however, results indicate that it wasn’t. The limited training is the responsibility of the MM&A operating organization who SHOULD have been teaching proper securement methods to ALL Train and Engine personnel as well as 1st level Operating Management. The statements that have been made by the Engineer indicate that he personally was not trained on the proper methods of securing his train.
Even if he were on the Hours of Service (and he wasn’t), properly securing a train is a allowed ‘violation’ as the securement is a matter of PUBLIC SAFETY. This incident highlights why this violation of HOS is allowed.
Norm,
That is the reason why I said I would like to hear the engineer’s response to this line of questioning about his feelings about shutting down the engine and stopping the pumping of air that would maintain the securement that he had made dependent upon the engine air brakes.
My point was not to try to convict the engineer. It was to explore whether Harding even realized that relying on air for securment was illegal, and whether he even realized the danger of stopping air pumping upon which this illegal securement depended. I ask this because something is missing in the engineer’s intention of securement and his willingness to allow the air pumping to stop until morning.
Therefore, I have a feeling that some of what appears to be missing might be explained by policies or verbal instructions from MM&A management. It may be, as some have said, that MM&A management failed to adequately train employees on train securement. But it also may be that management improperly trained its employees to take improper shortcuts in securement.
Without this missing piece in the explanation of Engineer Harding’s lack of concern for the stopping of air pumping, it appears that he was absolutely clueless about the process of securing trains. And that seems unlikely.
I would opine that the reason the RTC didn’t tell the engineer to go back and start an engine (and perhaps why no one else did) was because he (mistakenly) believed that the train was properly secured. If it were, then starting another locomotive would have had limited value - chiefly keeping the train on air to avoid the four hour rule.
OTOH, I don’t recall if the two ever discussed how many brakes had actually been applied.
Agreed. And you might check my prevous comment as to a conjecture, an hypothesis, not a fact, as to why.
[quote user=“Euclid”]
I appears to me too that Harding failed to follow the rules and procedures. He did not set enough handbrakes and he relied on the independent brake. But why do you blame his superiors for that? They did not tell him to do what he did to secure the train. Harding made those decisions and carried out the procedure, so why don’t you blame him rather than his superiors?
I did not intend my use of the word “feelings” to mean just emotion. You can change the word to “reasoning” if you like. That would be a better word for what I meant.
In any case, I am not trying to blame the engineer. I have no agenda as you keep insisting. Not only did Harding’s immdeiate supervisors give him various orders than may have affected the outcome; but Harding’s improper method of securing the train may have been dictated by a higher authority within the company. The only way to get to that is to ask Harding a lot of questions about his reasons and beliefs about the way he securred the train.
I am suspecting you must have been the trainer on MM&A on the procedures for securing trains.
However if we look further at the TSB rules and procedures at the time shall we. The TSB had no RULES or Regulations and the CP and CN also had no hard and fast rules in place on how many handbrakes to secure a train on a grade peroid. They had guidelines but nothing that stated failure to follow this rule will result in discipline or a fine in the case from the TSB. Your basing what he should have done off of the USA rules and regulations NOT Canadian which are a whole different hill of beans to swallow. What is required here in the States will get you laughed out in court in Canada. Yes we all know that everyone involved at the MMA screwed the pooch when it came to this accident however what we think he did wrong is not going to matter in a Canadian court of law one freaking bit. Just a word of advice from someone that is right now pulling her hair our dealing with a Canadian company that tore the hood off one of my bosses trucks in a truck stop and is refusing to pay for it. Our insurance carrier is having fits dealing with their insurer also Canadian and get this the same company but the Canadian side of the company.